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In the context of the Negro problem neither whites nor blacks, for excellent
reasons of their own, have the faintest desire to look back; but I think that
the past is all that makes the present coherent, and further that the past
will remain horrible for exactly as long as we refuse to assess it honestly.'
PART A: WHAT IS PAST IS PROLOGUE
I. INTRODUGTION
If we know, then we must fight for your life
as though it were our own-which it is_2
The interrelationship between African American women offenders,
the United States criminal justice system, and the conditions of the
larger community of African Americans in United States society has
rarely been a subject of concern. Twenty-five years ago, however, the
nation was riveted by what became one of the most historic political
trials in America: the trial of Angela Yvonne Davis for her alleged role
in an attempt to gain freedom for "The Soledad Brothers."3 The trial
1. James Baldwin, Me and My House.... HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Nov. 1955, at 54, repinted in
Notes of a Native Son, in THE PRICE OF THE TICKET: COLLECTED NONrCrION, 1948-1985, at 127
(1985).
2. James Baldwin, An Open Letter to My Sister, Angela Davis, in IF THEY COME IN THE
MORNING: VOICES OF RESISTANCE 13, 18 (AngelaY. Davis ed., 1971).
3. 1 BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA: AN HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA 304, 306 (Darlene Clark
Hine, Elsa Barkley Brown, Rosalyn Terborg-Penn, eds. 1993).
Angela Davis became active in the cause of the "Soledad Brothers." One of the Brothers,
George Jackson, was killed by guards for allegedly trying to escape; all charges against him,
however, had been dropped. George's brotherJonathan, went to the Marin County Courthouse
where a San Quentin inmate was being tried for the stabbing of a prisoner. Jonathan took
hostages and tried to escape. During the escape, Jackson, two prisoners, and a judge were
killed. Jackson took guns from Davis's house to facilitate the rescue attempt. In August 1970,
Davis was charged with murder, kidnapping and conspiracy. After a federal warrant was issued
for her arrest, Davis, then professor of philosophy at UCLA, went underground. On August 18,
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was significant for it provided a rare instance which revealed the
experiences of African American women within the criminal justice
system.' Describing her circumstances, Davis stated that "as the
accused in this case, I find myself at an enormous disadvantage. As
a Black woman, I must view my own case in the historical framework
of the fate which has usually been reserved for my people in
America's halls of justice."5 Although Angela Davis' case became a
cause celebre,6 many incarcerated African American women preceded
her, unknown, unheralded and undefended. In this respect, Angela
C. Thompson provides the more typical situation.
In 1988, Angela C. Thompson, an African American woman, was
seventeen years old when she was sentenced to a mandatory term of
fifteen years to life imprisonment for the sale of "crack" cocaine to an
undercover police officer.7 Thompson had no other criminal activity
on her record at the time of her arrest. The sale took place at her
uncle's home, who, according to the dissenting opinion in the New
York Court of Appeals,' was "running a major drug-selling operation
in Harlem."9 Selling the crack cocaine to the police agent qualified
as an A-1 felony because it weighed 2.3 grams 1°  If the crack
weighed one-tenth of an ounce less," the sale would have constitut-
1970, she was placed on the FBI's ten-most-wanted list. Davis was found in New York two
months later, extradited to California, and put in jail. After her capture, a "Free Angela"
movement developed. On February 23, 1972, Angela was released on $102,000 bail. She was
ultimately acquitted of all charges. The National Alliance against Racism and Political
Repression, with Davis as its co-chair, was formed by Davis' defense committee for the purpose
of defending political prisoners, the majority being blacks and Hispanics. Presently a tenured
professor with the History of Consciousness Department at the University of California-Santa
Cruz, Davis has remained politically active through her writings and lectures. Her books
include, ANGELA DAVIS: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1988), IF THEY COME IN THE MORNING (Angela
Davis ed., 1971), WOMiEN, CULTURE, AND POLTICS (1989), andWOMEN, RAcE, AND CLASS (1981).
Kenneth Auchincloss, The Angela Davis Case, NEvSWEEK, Oct. 26, 1970, at 18; Beverly Beyette,
Angela Davis Now: On a Quiet Street in Oakland, the Former Radical Activist Has Settled in But Not
Settled Down, LA. TmES, Mar. 8, 1989, § 5 (View), at 1.
4. See generally, Beyette, supra note 3, at 1 (describing how Davis compares her struggles
as an African American woman in the American criminaljustice system to the struggle of Winnie
Mandela against apartheid in South Africa).
5. DAvIS, IF THEY COME IN THE MORNING, supra note 3, at 240 (emphasis added).
6. Auchincloss, supra note 3, at 18.
7. NewYorkv. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1994), revgNewYorkv. Thompson, 596
N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). See generally, Nat Hentoff, 15 Years for a 17-Year-Old's First
Drug Sae, WASH. POST, Sept. 10,1994, atA23 (discussing the NewYorklegislature's need to keep
strict drug sentencing minimums laid out in the Rockefeller drug laws because of an increased
fear in the public of drug-related crimes); Gary Spencer, 'Rare Case' Exception Before Court of
Appeals, N.Y. LJ., Feb. 7, 1994, at 1 (discussing the impact of two NewYork trial case decisions
where judges refused to impose the harsh minimum sentence required by the Rockefeller drug
laws, stating that their decisions were "rare case" exceptions).
8. The New York Court of Appeals is the highest court in New York.
9. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1081.
10. N.Y. PENAL LAw §220.41, §220.43 (McKinney 1989).
11. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1082.
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ed an A-2 felony with a mandatory minimum sentence of three years,
compared to the fifteen year minimum of an A-1 felony.12
The trial judge, Juanita Bing-Newton, ruled that the mandatory
minimum sentence was cruel and unusual punishment under both
the Eighth Amendment of the United States and the New York State
Constitutions. 3 Accordingly, she sentenced Angela Thompson to
eight years to life imprisonment 4 In determining that "the draconi-
an sentence urged by the State, as applied to this defendant under
these circumstances would constitute cruel and inhuman punish-
ment,""5 the trial court focused on several factors, including Angela
Thompson's age, lack of criminal history and the pretrial plea offer
of three years to life.'6 The presentence report also revealed that
Angela Thompson was the single mother of a young son; that
Thompson's mother had died at the age of twenty-seven; and that by
the age of thirteen, Thompson had lived with various relatives until
moving in with an aunt in Queens, New York."
On appeal to the Appellate Division of the New York Supreme
Court, a majority of the court upheld the sentence of the trial
judge.' The Court of Appeals of New York also adopted the trial
court's sentence and found that, despite a long-term investigation with
numerous "buys" made at the location, Angela Thompson was not a
participant in any sales other than the transaction for which she was
convicted.'" That court further adopted the trial court's finding that
the drug offense was inconsistent with Thompson's life, stating that
"[t] he appellant's participation in the exchange appears to have been
made at the behest of her uncle, co-defendant Norman Little ....
She had no prior criminal record whatsoever prior to her involvement
in this case."29
The State of NewYork cross-appealed the lower sentence. The New
York Court of Appeals overturned the lower courts' decisions and
resentenced Angela Thompson to the mandatory minimum of fifteen
years to life imprisonment. Judge Levine, writing for the 4-2 majority
12. Id.
13. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 422 (invoking the "rare case" exception).
14. Id. (citing many factors for a reduced sentence, such as appellant's age, lack of criminal
history and a pre-trial offer of three years minimum sentencing).
15. Id (dting U.S. CONST. amend. VIII and N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 5).
16. Id. at 423.New York State is one of the few jurisdictions that would even try someone
Thompson's age as an adult under these circumstances. In most states and in the federal
system, she would be considered a youth.
17. Id. at 422.
18. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d 421 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
19. Id. at 422.
20. Id
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on the Court of Appeals, reversed the Supreme Court." Judge
Levine held that imposition of the mandatory minimum sentence of
fifteen years to life on the defendant, who was seventeen years old at
the time of the crime, did not constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment.2 Angela Thompson now serves a potential lifetime sentence
for a minor drug offense, and has become one more casualty in the
nation's war on drugs.
Angela Davis observed over twenty years ago that "sufficient
attention has not been devoted to women in prison."23 This need
remains urgent and largely unfulfilled, particularly with regard to
African American women. Although the American Correctional
Association's (ACA) national survey of imprisoned women in the
United States found the majority to be young, women of color, and
single mothers2 4 recent studies have produced important research
about women in crime and punishment, but have virtually ignored the
experiences of African American women. 5 Similarly, research in
African American criminality has focused almost exclusively on
males. 6 This is a stark omission considering that African American
women have been disproportionately incarcerated relative to their
numbers in the overall population. African American women
represent over forty percent of the women in United States federal
prisons." This statistic is alarming given that the total African
21. New York v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1994).
22. Id. at 1079.
23. DAVIS, IF THEY COME IN THE MORNING, supra note 3, at 109.
Former NOW President Aileen Hernandez recalled herJanuary 1971 visit with Angela Davis
in the Matin County jail after NOW adopted a statement supporting her right to a fair trial:
"We did not talk about her case .... [S]he talked about the sexist conditions in the jail-the
double standard for male and female prisoners. And then the brief visit was over." Aileen C.
Hernandez, Introduction to MARY TIMOTHY, JURY WOMAN: BY THE FOREPERSON OF THE ANGELA
DAVIS JURY at ix (1974).
24. AmERICAN CORREGIONALASSOCIATION, THE FEMALE OFFENDER: WHAT DOES THE FUTURE
HOLD? 47-50 (1990).
25. MICHAEL TONIwY, Prefac, to MALIGN NEGLECT-RACE, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN
AMERICA ix (1995). According to Tonry.
The rationale for focusing on men is slightly different. Racial disproportions are about
as bad in women's prisons as in men's. Like men, about half of female prisoners are
black. However, women make up only six to seven percent of the total number of
prisoners. Because one of [his] central arguments is that by removing so many young
black men from their families and communities, crime control policies are undermin-
ing efforts to ameliorate the conditions of life of the black urban underclass, the focus
on black men is necessary. The story of black women as offenders and as prisoners is
important, but it is a different story.
26. Id.
27. BUREAU OFJUSTiCESTATIMCS, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOKOF CRIMINALJUSTICE
STATISTCS 1991, at 636 [hereinafter SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS] (Table
6.97-Type of Commitment Offense Among Federal Prison Inmates by Sex and Race) (Timothy
J. Flanagan & Kathleen Maguire, eds., 1992). In 1992, African American women comprised 46%
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American population comprises but a mere twelve percent of the
entire U.S. population."
In large measure, the dearth of information and analysis of African
American women's criminality is attributable to dualistic approaches
to social issues, in which relevant categories have been deemed to be
race and/or ethnicity, and gender. This has resulted in the lack of
empirical data about women of color, including African American
women, in nearly all areas of social and scholarly inquiry.29  With
respect to criminology, the data historically has obscured information
of women in localjails. See LAWRENCE A. GREENFELD & STEPHANIE MINOR-HARPER, BUREAU OF
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN PRISON, SPECIAL REPORT, 2 (Table
1-Characteristics of State Prison Inmates, By Sex, 1986 and 1979) (1991) (stating that in 1986,
white women comprised 40% of women in state prison and Hispanic women comprised 13%
of women in state prison); see also TRACY L. SNELL, BUREAU OFJUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, WOMEN IN JAIL, SPECIAL REPORT 3 (Table 1-Characteristics ofJail Inmates, By Sex,
1989 and 1983) (1992) (stating that in 1989, white women comprised 38% of women in local
jails and Hispanic women comprised 16% of women in localjaiis).
28. Of course, the purpose of this article is not to minimize the magnitude of problems of
incarcerated African American men, whose actual numbers are far greater than those of
incarcerated African American women. See MARC MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, YOUNG
BLACK MEN AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: A GROWING NATIONAL PROBLEM: 3 (1990)
[hereinafter THE SENTENCING PROJECT] (stating that throughout the United States, nearly one
in four black men (23%), between the ages of 20 and 29, is currently under some form of
criminal restraint-prison, jail, probation or parole). Although they constitute only 6% of the
national population, African American men comprise 47%of the U.S. prison population.
According to the National Center on Institutions and Alternatives, in Washington, DC and
Baltimore, MD, 42% to 65% of black males 18-35 years old were under criminal justice system
control, respectively. Id. "According to a study prepared by the Sentencing Project, the black
male rate of incarceration is 3,109 per 10,000, considerably higher than the rate of 729 per
100,000 in South Africa." The New York State Judicial Commission on Minorities, "[tihe
'Williams Commission' found that although people of color comprise only 22% of the state's
overall population, the prison population in NewYork State is 82% black and Hispanic." Diane
R. Gatewood, Number of Imprisoned Black Males is a Concern of Black Women Laugers, N.Y. L.J., May
1, 1992, at S-9.
Rather, the point is that while African American women's representation in U.S. prisons and
jails has been exceedingly high, minor attention has been given to their ever-increasing
concerns. ProfessorJudy Scales-Trent states the case well:
I have a long-standing interest in legal and policy issues facing African-American
women. Are there issues which are invisible because these women are invisible? The
burgeoning legal literature about black women shows that the issues are indeed there,
but they have been hidden, as the group too has been hidden-too unimportant to
see, not worthy of study.
Judy Scales-Trent, Using Literature in Law Schook The Importance of Reading and Telling Stories, 7
BERKELEY WOMEN's LJ. 90, 90-91 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Judy Scales-Trent, Black Women and the Constitution: Finding Our Place, Asserting
Our Rights, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L L. REV. 9, 10-11 (1989) (discussing the confusion and
disagreement regardingAfrican American women's status as "blacks" or as "women" for purposes
of the Civil Rights Act protection, and calling for a separate category of "black woman" in order
to recognize the unique civil rights concerns of black women); see also Kimberle Crenshaw,
Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine,
Feminist Theoy and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 139 (1989) (stating the need to
address the experiences of black women separate from black men and white women); Angela
P. Harris, Race andEssentialism in Feminist Legal Theoy, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990) (addressing
the need to avoid gender essentialism, the process of classifying all women's experiences as one).
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specifically about African American women's experiences. The
Uniform Grime Reports, for example, gives information on arrest
rates for African Americans and arrest rates for women but does not
give information on African American women. Information is
available as to the number of black and white females in state prison,
but information is lacking as to the offenses committed by these
women and any prior sentences served by them as well as information
concerning their socioeconomic and employment status.30
In contemporary times, as in the past, poverty is the major
correlative in African American women's involvement in criminali-
ty." Relatedly, and particularly characteristic of the modem era, state
and federal emphasis on mandatory and guideline sentencing
schemes, coupled with the nation's "war on drugs," has resulted in a
substantial increase in African American women's incarceration.3 2
Women are much more likely than men to be serving sentences for
drug offenses and other non-violent crimes with economic motives.
In 1991, almost sixty-four percent of females in federal institutions
were serving sentences for a drug-related offense.3  Property
offenses were the second most common offenses committed by
women.3
Moreover, the number of women in state and federal prison more
than tripled from 1980 to 1990, from 12,331 to 40,484." During the
past two decades, the female prison population grew by over 700%,
30. Diane K. Lewis, Black Women Offenders and CriminalJustice: Some Theoretical Considerations,
in COMPARING FEMALE AND MALE OFFENDERS 89-90 (Marguerite Q. Warren ed., 1981).
31. TRACY SNELL, WOMEN IN PRISON 1991 2 (1994) (noting that women in state prisons, in
1991 were more likely to be black (46%), young (50% ages 25 to 34), and unemployed at the
time of arrest (53%)). See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, SERIES,
P60-185, POVERTY IN THE UNITED STATES: 1992, at I (Table 1: Number, Poverty Rate, and
Standard Errors of Persons, Families, and Unrelated Individuals Below the Poverty Level: 1992
and 1991), 147 (Table 23- Poverty Threshold, By Size of Family and Number of Related
Children, 1992) (1993) (stating that in 1992, nearly 40 million people lived under the official
poverty level, which is $9,137 for a family of two, $11,186 for a family of three and $14,335 for
a family of four. Although two-thirds of the poor are white Americans, the poverty rates in the
African American community are the highest in the nation, at thirty-three and one-third
percent. By comparison, the national average is about fifteen and one-half percent.). See also
Marguerite Q. Warren, Gender Comparisons in Crime and Delinquency, in COMPARING FEMALE AND
MALE OFFENDERS 11 (Marguerite Q. Warren ed., 1981).
32. Neil Steinberg, The Law of Unintended Consequences, ROLLING STONE, May 5, 1994,
reprinted in CRIMINAL SENTENCING 44-45 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1995) (discussing that the
effect of mandatory sentencing, specifically in relation to drug offenses, has been to divide
offenders along racial lines, with African American offenders serving much longer sentences
than white offenders).
33. Sue Klein, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, A Profile ofFemale Offenders in the Federal Bureau of Prisons,
FED. PRISONS J. Spring 1992, at 33-34.
34. Id
35. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 636.
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while the male prison population grew by less than 400%.11 In New
York alone, from 1982 to 1992, the number of women prisoners
increased from 77217 to 2501--a 324% increase.
Angela Thompson's case is paradigmatic of the present situation of
many African American women in the United States criminal justice
system. Viewed in light of the historic abuses of indeterminate
sentencing schemes, 9 however, the fundamental issue to be ad-
dressed is whether the modern drug laws, in mandating life imprison-
ment and lifetime parole, operate disparately in communities of color
and/or prescribe sentences so disproportionately severe as to
constitute cruel and unusual punishment in violation of constitutional
limitations.4'
This article will examine the modem rendering of 'just deserts
theory"41 and analyze the Eighth Amendment as a mandate for
proportionate punishment, with particular attention to the lives of
African American women. Further, this article will examine the
complex and often contradictory legal and societal impulses which
have sought to diminish African American women's life chances, by
denying them access to necessary societal resources and constructing
them as unworthy and deserving of enhanced criminal punishment.4"
36. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 636.
37. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, DmECTORY OF JUVENILE AND ADULT
CORRECTIONAL DEP'TS, INSTITUTIONS, AGENCIES AND PAROLING AUTHORITIES xii (Diana N.
Travisono ed., 43d ed. 1983).
38. AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, DIRECTORY OF NATIONAL JAIL AND ADULT
DETENTION 270 (6th ed. 1993).
39. ROBERT EMMET LONG, CRIMINAL SENTENCING 40 (Robert Emmet Long ed., 1995)
(stating the often cited argument that indeterminate sentences allow criminals to serve
minimum prison sentences and then, once released, repeat their crimes).
40. Steinberg, supra note 32, at 44-45.
41. "Just deserts theory" is the theory that greater weight should be placed on the severity
of the crime rather than on background characteristics of the person accused. Richard S. Frase,
State Sentencing Guidelines: Still Going Strong, 78 JUDICATURE 173 (1995).
42. Professor Dorothy Roberts has provided excellent writings in this area, with particular
focus on the criminalization of African American women for drug use during pregnancy and
other aspects of devaluation and criminalization of African American motherhood. Professor
Roberts' writings have focused primarily on equal protection (Fourteenth Amendment) and
privacy (Fourteenth Amendment) analysis regarding the circumstances of African American
women whose drug use reinforces white devaluation of them and triggers their disparate
treatment within the criminal law. While the issues addressed in this article are amenable to
disparate treatment/equal protection analysis, the article's focus on the broader circumstances
of African American women's excessive punishment (for all levels of drug involvement) which
necessitates constitutional analysis under the Eighth Amendment. In this manner, Eighth
Amendment analysis requires examination of the qualitative differences in African American
women's punishment that give rise to disparate treatment. See Dorothy E. Roberts, C0ire, Race,
and Reproduction, 67 TUL. L. REV. 1945 (1993) (converging two interests of the law: the racial
construction of crime and the use of reproduction as an instrument of punishment); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IOWA L. REV. 95 (1993) (probing the historical relationship
between motherhood and crime, and suggesting societal reasons for this relationship); Dorothy
E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right to
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It also will examine their resistance in opposition to negative cultural
images, biased laws and legitimated cruelty.
The article will survey African American women's experiences in
crime and punishment during three major periods: (1) the Colonial
Period; (2) the Nineteenth Century; and (3) the Present Day. In Part
A, the article begins with an analysis of African American women's
early involvement in the United States criminal justice system. This
section also examines the legal and social construction of enslaved
persons' putative criminality and their opposition to subordination.
An historical-social perspective is essential for understanding the
present response to African American women offenders within the
criminal justice system. This section also reveals the means in which
prevailing ideologies historically have justified unequal and harsh
treatment of African American women within correctional systems.
Part B provides an analysis of the origins of negative cultural images
of African American women. These images have been responsible for
limiting their participation throughout American society and often
leading to their increased participation in criminal activity. Part C
shifts to an analysis of African American women offenders' present
position in the criminal justice system and considers the continuing
effects of negative social stereotypes and social disadvantages within
the context of sentencing reform and Eighth Amendment principles.
The examination of these issues focuses on African American
women's experiences under the NewYork mandatory drug sentencing
schemes, which exemplify modem sentencing reform in state and
federal government.43
The article argues that the progression toward mandatory sentenc-
ing not only perpetuates the historically devalued status of African
American women, construing them as undeserving of social benefits
and as intrinsically incorrigible, but also metes out disparate and
unconstitutionally disproportionate sentences in violation of the
Eighth Amendment.' The article will analyze the Angela Thompson
Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1419 (1991) (arguing that punishing black women for maternal
substance abuse is wrong because these women historically have come under the greatest weight
of societal disadvantage); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1993) (recognizing the need to look at racism and feminism
together in order to see the resulting effect on African American women, which is more than
the sum of its parts).
43. The focus on the New York State sentencing scheme is important in light of the
Thompson case. See infra, Part C, III, this text. Moreover, in 1973, Governor Nelson Rockefeller
initiated one of the first efforts to remove sentencing discretion from judges and to impose
harsh mandatory sentences for drug offenses. The "Rockefeller Drug Laws" are widely regarded
as spawning similar sentencing reform efforts in other state and federaljurisdictions. LAWRENCE
M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERicAN HISTORY 411 (1993).
44. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
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case within the context of historical forces and policies which
continue to operate in discriminatory and harsh ways in the lives of
African American women. Thus, by focusing on African American
women, this article intends to contribute to a greater understanding
of African American women's history and experiences in the United
States criminal justice system, and more broadly, to provide a useful
critique of modem trends in United States sentencing policy.
II. THE COLONIAL PERIOD
African American women's presence in America began when a
seized Spanish cargo ship bound for the West Indies landed in
Jamestown, Virginia in 1619.' Isabella, Antony, Pedro, and seven-
teen other Africans aboard the ship were offered by the Dutch
seamen in exchange for food.16 In the early decades of the seven-
teenth century, there were few distinctions in the concept between
black and white servitude; the terms "slave" and "servant" were used
synonymously.47 As Professor Orlando Patterson argues, "[g] radually
there emerged, however, something new in the conception of the
black servant the view that he did not belong to the same communi-
ty of Christian, civilized Europeans."
48
English-speaking European settlers brought their common law legal
system when they arrived in the early seventeenth century, on land
that is now part of the United States.49 Despite variations among the
colonies, they developed consistent criminal law traditions which were
both patriarchal and hierarchical." The emergent United States
criminal justice system was particularly repressive toward slaves,
servants, and women as laws and legal customs in the colonies
reflected the values of elites, magistrates, and leaders regarding virtue,
justice, and order."' The influence of religion was significant in
45. LERONE BENNET, JR., BEFORE THE MAYFLOWER: A HISTORY OF THE NEGRO IN AMERICA
1619-1964, at 30 (rev. ed. 1966).
46. Id. See also A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE & THE
AMERICAN LEGAL PROCESS: THE COLONIAL PERIOD 20-22 (1978) (discussing the debate regarding
the status, whether free or slave, of blacks when they were unwillingly brought to Virginia in
1619).
47. As historian WinthropJordan observed, in the early years (pre-1640), both servants and
slaves were abused and forced to serve their masters for many years. WINTHROP D. JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 45-48 (1968).
48. ORLANDO PATrERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 7 (1982).
49. There was a rich legal history on the continent before the white settlers arrived,
including Spanish-speaking settlements in present day Florida and Puerto Rico, and, Dutch
settlements in present day New York. Also, of course, indigenous peoples had established
societies, with norms, laws and systems of punishment. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 19.
50. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 31.
51. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 23.
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shaping the criminal codes. As Professor Friedman notes, the
criminal justice system, in many ways, was another arm of the religious
orthodoxy in framing modes of enforcement, and generally, in
creating a distinctive legal culture. 2 Further, while religion was a
powerful influence in both European and American societies, it was
thought to be more so in New England than in old England. 5
Offenses against morality were punished by the "heavy use of shame
and shaming."54 Although the purpose was repentance, punishment
was often public and brutal, including pillory and stocks, mutilations
and whippings.55 Whipping was a very common punishment for
servants and slaves.56  Free whites and white servants received
corporal punishment and the death penalty during the colonial
period, though much less so than blacks.57
Capital punishment was invoked more frequently in the southern
colonies, with slaves as the most common victims. 8  In Virginia,"
for example, white authorities reserved the most severe sanctions for
slaves. Between 1801 and 1865, Virginia authorities "ordered...
thousands of slaves [to] be whipped or given other corporal punish-
ments, sent at least 983 slaves into exile between 1801 and 1865, and
condemned at least 555 to death between 1706 and 1784 and
executed 628 between 1785 and 1865." ° "This was a much higher
death toll than in any northern state."" However, one of the most
extreme episodes of capital punishment in the colonial period took
place in the North, in New York, in 1741.62 It too had a racial
element, concerning an alleged plot by blacks, in conspiracy with
whites, "to rise up, pillage, and burn."6 3 Following a major conspira-
cy trial, more than 150 slaves, along with twenty whites, were tried,'
52. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 23.
53. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 19 (noting, for example, that Massachusetts was occupied
by the Puritans while Pennsylvania and, for a while, NewJersey, belonged to the Quakers).
54. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 37.
55. Branding, letter-wearing, and mutilation were other forms of bodily punishment.
FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 40-41.
56. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 37.
57. PHILIPJ. ScHWnARTz, TWicE CONDEMNED: SLAVES AND THE CRIMINAL LAWS OF VIRGINIA,
1705-1865, at ix (1988).
58. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44.
59. Virginia was "the largest slave society in North America from 1705 through 1865...."
Schwartz, supra note 56, at xi.
60. SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at ix.
61. SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at ix; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44 & n.75
(describing the motive, manner and frequency of the death penalty and pardons in early
America). Mr. Friedman also compares and contrasts the severity of earlyAmerican punishment
to the more lenient pre-revolutionary English punishment.
62. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44.
63. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44.
64. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44.
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resulting in the execution of over thirty slaves, eighteen of whom were
hanged while thirteen were burned alive, and four whites, who were
hanged.65
Also occurring in the North and what was perhaps the most
infamous aspect of colonial criminal justice were the witch-hunts of
the late seventeenth century.66 Although not all individuals accused
of being witches were women, most were. In Puritan thought, both
slaves and women were subordinated as part of the natural order.'
The witch symbolized "the very embodiments of evil" and rebellion
against order- "of woman against man, and woman against the godly
society."69  Historians' comparisons of the penalties imposed on
women and men reveal further differences. As compared to women,
men were tried less often and were less likely to be found guilty; and
when they were found guilty, their sentences were much less
severe.
70
The most extensive witch-hunt in New England unfolded in Salem
Village, Massachusetts. 71  The investigation of the Salem episode,
which began in 1692, is attributed to a slave woman named Tituba.
Tituba and her husband, John Indian, were slaves, originally from
Barbados. They were taken to Salem by their owner, Rev. Samuel
Parris. 3 John was hired out to a tavern keeper and Tituba to a
weaver. Tituba cared for Parris' ill wife and his children as well as
provided the family with needed woven goods.7 4
65. FRiEDMAN, supra note 43, at 44 & n.76.
66. Witchcraft trials were more prevalent in the northern colonies. For example, in 1648,
the laws of Massachusetts classified witchcraft as a capital offense. In comparison, Professor
Friedman notes that in North Carolina there were only three instances of such trials before
1730. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 45.
Even before the Salem trials of 1692, during which almost 200 persons were accused of
witchcraft, there were at least 100 persons charged or convicted of witchcraft. Between 1648 and
1663, the colonies of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and New Haven executed 15 persons. During
the Salem trials, these colonies executed an additional 19 persons. DAVID D. HALL, WrCH-
HUNTING IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY NEW ENGLAND: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1638-92, at 4
(David D. Hall ed., 1991).
67. Women comprised three-fourths of persons accused of witchcraft in Salem. In fact, 14
of the 20 persons executed were women. Bruce Watson, Salem's Dark Hour: Did the Devil Make
Them Do It?, SMrrHSONIAN, Apr. 1992, at 116, 128. "According to historian John Demos, most
New England witches were poor women over forty. Some were healers or midwives who had lost
a patient or miraculously saved one. They were considered abrasive or quarrelsome, 'deviant,'
in other words." I& (citingJOHN DEMOS, ENTERTAINING SATAN: WITCHCRAFt AND THE CULTURE
oF EARLY NEv ENGLAND (1982)).
68. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 47.
69. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 46-47 & n.86.
70. HALL, supra note 66, at 6-7.
71. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172.
72. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172.
73. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172.
74. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172.
CRIME AND SENTENCING
Tituba entertained the children with stories about Barbados,
evoking the warmth and beauty of the island, telling stories of
animals that could talk and of magic spells, and reading their
palms. Gradually the parsonage became a meeting place for bound
girls who were eager to hear Tituba's stories of a livelier, more
colorful world.... Some of the girls listening to Tituba's stories,
including Parris' daughter and niece, became hysterical, performing
strange antics, crying out, and barking like dogs. Some of the girls
accused Tituba; Sarah Good, a vagrant; and Sarah Osborne, a sick
old woman, of having bewitched them. In 1692, these three women
became the first persons to be accused of practicing witchcraft in
Salem Village.7'
The specially appointed court, fearing the unusual and dangerous
character of witchcraft, discarded the traditional rules of evidence and
procedure.7 6 Instead, a confession to practicing witchcraft was beaten
out of Tituba who, as a result, was imprisoned for thirteen months,
despite her insistence that she was not a witch."
"We are either saints or devils," the Reverend Parris preached.78
Hence, the inculcation of the oppositional "we-they" distinction
emerged from the "fusion of race, religion, and nationality in a
generalized conception of us-white, English, free-and them-black,
heathen, slave."79 At their zenith, during the witch trials in seven-
teenth century America, these dichotomies justified cruel treatment
of enslaved persons of African descent, rationalized the creation of
laws that specifically limited their rights in the dominant legal culture,
and further indelibly linked blackness with evil and criminality. As
historian Kathryn Preyer observed:
However unequally financial sanctions or corporal punishments
may have fallen on the lower classes in colonial society, no matter
what the degree of class control penal measures represent within
the white population, the greatest discriminatory power of the
penal law is to be seen in the case of slaves."0
75. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 45 & n.80.
76. FRIEDMAN supra note 43, at 46 & n.82.
77. Hine, supra note 3, at 1172. According to historian David Hall, as the seventeenth
century approached, there were very few accusations of witchcraft, with no executions from 1663
to 1688. This practice, however, drastically changed as a result of the Salem witch-hunt. HALL,
supra note 66, at 11.
After the Salem trials, until early into the eighteenth century, however, people continued to
make accusations of witchcraft. And, the legend of witches continued even after witchcraft was
no longer a crime. HALL, supra note 66, at 12.
78. Watson, supra note 67, at 116.
79. PATrERSON, supra note 48, at 7.
80. Kathryn Preyer, Penal Measures in the American Colonies: An Overview, 26 AM. J. LEGAL
HIST. 326, 352 (1982).
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Although there is no further record of Tituba, her ordeal before
the colonial Puritan court reveals her position at the intersection of
legally sanctioned injustice and cruel punishment.
III. THE STATUS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN THE
NINETEENTH CENTURY
A. Antebellum America
Americans' perceptions of crime and criminals mirror both colonial
and nineteenth century views of poverty and race.s" As stated by
ProfessorJane Gibson-Carpenter & ProfessorJames Carpenter, these
views "reproduce pejorative stereotypes of minorities and poor people;
induce unwarranted fear of increasing crime; promote a siege
mentality on the part of the police and poor neighborhoods; and
predispose every level of the criminal justice system to find crime
where the light shines brightest, among the poor."2
Relative to the nineteenth century one historian has stated that,
"[t]o be a black woman in nineteenth century America was to live in
the double jeopardy of belonging to the 'inferior' sex of an 'inferior'
race."
83
The experiences of enslavement were different for African
American women and men.' Enslaved African American women
81. Jane W. Gibson-Carpenter and James E. Carpenter, Race, Poverty, andJustice: Looking
Where the Streethght Shines, 3 KAN.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 99, 99 (1994). See also David C. Leven, Curing
America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAM URB. LJ. 641, 648 (1993) (stressing the need for
rehabilitation programs for drug offenders).
82. Gibson-Carpenter and Carpenter, supra note 81, at 99.
83. WEAREYOUR SISTERS: BLACKWOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY IX (Dorothy Sterling
ed., 1984) (presenting an informal history including letters, diaries, and newspaper articles of
black women who lived between 1800 and the 1880s).
84. Historian Deborah Gray White notes that "[m]ale and female slavery was different from
the very beginning." DEBORAH GRAY WHITE, AR'N'T I A WOMAN? FEMALE SLAVES IN THE
PLANTATION SouTH 63 (1985). Women generally did not travel the middle passage in the holds
of slave ships but took the dreadedjourney on the quarter deck. According to the 1789 Report
of the Committee of the Privy Council, the female passage was further distinguished from that
of males in that women and girls were not shackled. Id
"This policy had at least two significant consequences for black women. First, they were more
easily accessible to the criminal whims and sexual desires of seamen, and few attempts were
made to keep the crew members of slave ships from molesting African women (footnote
omitted). As one slaver reported, officers were permitted to indulge their passions at pleasure
and were sometimes guilty of such brutal excesses as disgrace human nature." Id. (footnote
omitted) (quoting GEORGE FRANCIS Dow, SLAVE SHIPS AND SLAVING 145 (1927)).
"Conversely, African women were occasionally able to incite and/or assist slave insurrections
that occurred at sea. For instance, in 1721 the crew on board the Robert was stunned when they
were attacked by a woman and two men intent on gaining their freedom. Before they were
subdued by the captain and other crew members, the slaves, including the woman, had killed
several sailors and wounded many others. In his investigation into the mutiny, Captain Harding
reflected on the near success of the slaves and found that they had been assisted by the woman
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were exploited for their physical labor and reproductive capacities;
"[thei]rjob was to work and to produce workers." 5 Their reproduc-
tive function was crucial to the economic interests of the slaveholders,
especially after 1801, when Congress outlawed the importation of
slaves from Africa into the United States. 6 The exploitation of
African American women's sexuality was also a means of terrorizing
the entire slave community. 7 Former slave Harriet Ann Jacobs
recounted the unique turmoil of her enslaved existence in her
autobiography:
I now entered on my fifteenth year-a sad epoch in the life of a
slave girl. My master began to whisper foul words in my ear ...
[I] was compelled to live under the same roof with him-where I
saw a man forty years my senior daily violating the most sacred
commandments of nature. He told me I was his property; that I
must be subject to his will in all things. My soul revolted against
the mean tyranny. But where could I turn for protection?... [I]
know that some are too much brutalized by slavery to feel the
humiliation of their position; but many slaves feel it most acutely,
and shrink from the memory of it.
When they told me my newborn babe was a girl, my heart was
heavier than it had ever been before. Slavery is terrible for men;
but it is far more terrible for women. Superadded to the burden
common to all, they have wrongs, and sufferings, and mortifications
peculiarly their own.
'who being more at large, was to watch the proper Opportunity.' The woman had served as a
lookout and alerted the leader as to the number of sailors on deck. She had also stolen all the
weapons used in the mutiny." She was punished savagely for her feats: "The Woman he hoisted
up by the Thumbs, whipped, and slashed her with Knives before the other Slaves till she died."
Id. at 63-64. (footnote omitted) (quoting 2 DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE HISTORY OF THE
SLAVE TRADE TO AMFRCA 266 (Elizabeth Donnan ed., 1930)).
"In another incident, in 1785, the captain of a Bristol slaver was attacked by a group of women
who tried to throw him overboard. When he was rescued by his crew the women threw
themselves down the hatchway. Some died from the injuries incurred in their desperate plunge.
Others starved themselves to death. Nine years earlier a similar incident had occurred aboard
the Rhode Island vessel, Thames." Id. at 63-64 & n.6. See also infra Part A, III, D, this text.
85. Sterling, supra note 83, at x. See also JACQUELINE JONES, LABOR OF LOVE, LABOR OF
SoRRoW: BACK WOMEN, WORK, AND THE FAMILY FROM SLAVERY TO THE PRESENT 11-12 (1985)
(discussing the double exploitation of slave women, for both their physical labor and
reproductive ability).
86. Darlene Hine and Kate Wittenstein, Female Slave Resistance: The Economics of Sex, in THE
BLACK WOMAN CROSs-CULTURALLY 289, 296 (Filomina Chioma Steady ed., 1981).
87. The sexual exploitation of enslaved women was also a way to humiliate and symbolically
attack enslaved men. Angela Davis, Reflectians on the Black Woman's Role in the Community of Slaves,
in 12 BLACK SCHOLAR Nov.-Dec. 1981, at 2, 12-13.
88. Harriet Ann Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl: Written by Herself, in WRITTEN BY
HERSELF: AUTOBIOGRAPHIES OF AMERCAN WOMEN: AN ANTHOLOGY 7, at 10-12 (Jill Kerr Conway
ed., 1992) (emphasis in original).
Similarly, the enslaved woman Bethany Veney noted the increased tension accompanying the
birth of a daughter, whose "almost certain doom is to minister to the unbridled lust of the
slaveowner. When Veney's daughter was born, she wished that both of them could 'die right
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Slave girls, whose work began at the age of four or five, had
responsibilities at a much earlier age than slave boys.8" The girls
began by caring for babies and by the age of ten worked full-time
either in the house or in the fields."0 "At the point of puberty, a
slave girl was doing the work of a woman, which was scarcely
distinguishable from a man's."9' To till the soil, enslaved African
American women were often grouped with white and African
American men.
92
During this period, white women were hampered by the "bonds of
true womanhood" and told that their sphere was the home. In
addition to being a "woman in a society ruled by men," black women
had to face being "black in a white society, and slave in a free
society."93 These three forces served to make African American
women the least powerful group of individuals in antebellum America.
B. Slave Criminality
Enslaved men and women generally were outside of the public
system of punishment. 4 Instead, slaves were disciplined by their
owners, as only free blacks were eligible for public punishment. The
criminal justice system, however, was instrumental in maintaining
dominion over slaves and former slaves. Comprehensive slave codes
created by state legislatures regulated the relationship of slaves to
society. 5  Legally, slaves were at once property and persons.
Ironically, slaves came closest to personhood and equality under the
law upon allegations of criminality. The law in a criminal trial
considered a slave to be a responsible individual and therefore meted
out harsh punishments accordingly.
96
there and then'." PAULA GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER: THE IMPACT OF BLACK WOMEN
ON RACE AND SEX IN AMERICA 44 & nn.29-30 (1984) (quoting BETHANY VENEY, THE NARRATIVE
OF BETHANY VENEY, A SLAVE WOMAN 26 (1889)).
89. Sterling, supra note 83, at 6.
90. Sterling, supra note 83, at 7.
91. Sterling, supra note 83, at 13.
92. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 36-37; see alsoJORDAN, supra note 47, at 77. For example,
a 1643 Virginia statute designated that "tithable persons"--those who worked the ground,
whether slave or free-included all adult men and black women. Maryland enacted a similar
statute in 1654. (footnote omitted).
93. WHITE, supra note 84, at 15.
94. See infra pp. 17-19.
95. KENNETH STAMPp, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION: SLAVERYIN THEANTE-BELLUM SOUTH 171-
91 (1956) (reciting examples of "punishment" inflicted on slaves and condoned by state
legislatures); see also SCHWARTZ, supra note 57, at 26-28 (describing the severity of the criminal
system toward slaves as compared to free people).
96. DANIELJ. FLANIGAN, THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: 1800-1868, 1-2 (and
sources cited) (1987); see also MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, 1810-1860:
CONSIDERATIONS OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST (1981).
[Vol. 4:1
Fall 1995] CRIME AND SENTENCING 17
This paradox was epitomized by United States v. Amy, 97 the first case
in which a slave was a defendant in a federal prosecution. Amy was
accused of stealing a letter from the United States mail. Amy's
attorney objected to her prosecution by arguing that she could not be
considered a "person" subject to the penalties of the law. Amy was
convicted, and her appeal was heard by Chief Justice Taney, who
authored the Supreme Court opinion in Dred Scott v. Sandford.98
Following the reasoning in Dred Scott, the defense attorney argued that
"[b]y indicting Amy under an act of Congress that forbade 'any
person' to steal a letter from the United States mail, the government
had confounded Amy's natural personality with her status as legal
property."99 It was argued that if the act was construed to include
Amy, it was unconstitutional because it operated to take private
property without just compensation. In a perverse defense, Amy's
attorney argued on her behalf that, Amy should be "tried, and, if
guilty, properly punished under the state laws, for larceny.. .She
ought to be whipped, and sent about her business. .. ."100 In
overruling the motion for a new trial, ChiefJustice Taney propound-
ed on the slave's dual legal status: "He is a person, and also property.
As property, the rights of [sic] owner are entitled to the protection of
the law. As a person, he is bound to obey the law, and may, like any
other person, be punished if he offends against it.. .
United States v. Amy was unique since it was the first time that the
issue regarding the slave's human or property status in the criminal
context arose in a federal court."2 Southern state courts had
97. 24 Cas. 792 (No.14,445) C.C.D. (Va. 1859); see also FIGAN, supra note 96, at 3,
(discussing whether a "slave" was a "person" for purposes of punishment).
98. 60 U.S. 393 (1857) (holding that slaves were not to be considered citizens).
99. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 2-3. "Though he was partially incorrect, Howard argued
that slaves were not subject to the common law and that they could be punished only under
penal statutes specifically directed at the servile class. True, the framers of the United States
Constitution had not included the word "slave" in that document and had twice designated
slaves as "persons." But on both occasions the framers had been speaking of these natural
persons as property." Id. at 2-3.
100. Amy, 24 F. Gas. at 795. The federal act punished the theft of United States mail by
imprisonment from two to ten years. At defense counsel's suggestion, Amy would be subject to
the harsh corporal punishment of whipping.
101. Amy, 24 F. Gas. at 810. Although Chief Justice Taney cited no authority for the
proposition, the matter had been considered previously. Federalist No. 54 described the way
in which a southerner would classify the legal status of slaves, writing that, "we must deny the
fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no respect whatever as persons. The
true state of the case is, that they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our laws,
in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as property." THE FEDERALIST No. 54 (James
Madison or Alexander Hamilton).
102. FLAINJIGAN, supra note 96, at 5 (citing THOMAS R.R COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF
NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN HisToRicAL
SKErCH OF SLAVERY 89, 263 (1968)).
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resolved similar dilemmas by establishing comprehensive slave codes
regulating the relationship of the slave to society.10 3 On occasions
when the legislature inadvertently omitted specific offenses from the
slave codes, the courts had to decide whether a slave could be
considered a person within the meaning of the regular penal
statutes." With some variation from state to state, slaves were
accorded human status under the penal code only when it was
absolutely necessary for the punishment of a crime.105
The punishment inflicted on slaves was often brutal. Common
punishments during the early colonial period and often extending
into the nineteenth century included cropping of the ears, branding,
and castration."6 Slave owners rationalized their brutality as
necessary for efficient work performance. 7
103. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 5 (citing THOMAS IR. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF
NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF SLAVERY 89, 263 (1968)).
104. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 5 (citing THOMAS R.R. COBB, AN INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF
NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO WHICH IS PREFIXED, AN HISTORICAL
SKETCH OF SLAVERY 89, 263 (1968)).
105. For example, "according to Judge Thomas R.R. Cobb, ... a Georgia jurist, [Chief
Justice] Taney was wrong in U.S. v. Amy. A year before Taney's decision Cobb had written that
slaves could be punished only under special statutes." However, the Georgia law did not apply
to all of the slaveholding states. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 5 (citing THOMAS R.R- COBB, AN
INQUIRY INTO THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO WHICH IS
PREFrXED, AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF SLAVERY 89, 263 (1968)).
In the 1790s, South Carolina judges developed a different rule. See State v. Simmons &
Kitchen, 3 S.C.L. 6 (1794) (holding that slaves have rights under the laws and have the capacity
to commit crimes). The Louisiana Supreme Court, during the 1840s and 1850s, was ambiguous
in its rulings. In 1854, two whites, who had assisted a slave escape from jail, defended on the
ground that the statute forbade assisting 'any person' escape from jail and thus did not include
slaves. The court rejected this argument stating that although slaves were for the most part
property, they could be 'persons' for some purposes, including the present situation. In
contrast, a year later, the court held that a slave could be punished for manslaughter of another
slave even though this crime was not listed as a crime in the slave code. The court agreed with
the defendant that neither the general criminal statutes nor the common law was applicable;
however, the court affirmed the conviction because of the catch-all clause of the slave code
allowing courts to punish for any crimes not included in the code. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at
5-6 (citing 2 JUDICIAL CASES CONCERNING AMERICAN SLAVERY AND THE NEGRO 277 (Helen T.
Catterall ed., 1929) II, 277.
106. Even cropping of the ears remained as a punishment for many years. Until 1827
Delaware's punishments for attempted rape included "whipping, nailing to the pillory, and loss
of ears.... ." Until 1821, Maryland allowed cropping of the ears as a punishment for slaves. As
late as 1847, Virginia allowed cropping of the ears as a punishment for hog stealing and pejury;
South Carolina continued this practice into the nineteenth century, and Georgia continued the
practice until the 1830s. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 13 (citing 2 JOHN C. HURD, THE LAW OF
FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN THE UNITED STATES 21, 77, 79, (1968)); and JAMES C. BALLAGH, A
HISTORY OF SLAVERY IN VIRGINIA 87 (1902)).
"Branding, which served both as punishment and as a means of protecting innocent
purchasers from buying criminal bondsmen, survived in a few states until the late antebellum
period." Alabama, Georgia, and Mississippi, for example, continued brandingwell into the latter
1800s. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 14-15.
107. Sterling, supra note 83, at 333.
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In the nineteenth century, revenge generally was replaced as a goal
of criminal punishment.' For example, the Alabama constitution
directed future legislators to base the penal code "on principles of
reformation and not of vindictive justice.""°  However, these
principles were ignored by legislators when they formed the. slave
code."' Moreover, although some of the more brutal punishments
of the colonial period declined in the nineteenth century, every state
still had a larger number of offenses for slaves than for whites."'
In general, when statutes designated a crime as capital, any attempt
by a slave to commit that crime resulted in a death sentence."2
Whites did not incur similar penalties for mere attempts."1 At-
tempted poisoning, though only a form of attempted murder, always
108. GEORGE M. STROUD, A SKETCH OF THE LAWS RELATING TO SLAVERY IN THE SEVERAL
STATES OF THE UNITED STATES OF AmERIcA 178 (2d ed. 1856).
109. Id
110. "While statutes applying to whites carefully divided homicide into degrees and
distinguished between murder and manslaughter, slaves usually could be guilty of mere
homicide ofwhites. For example, the Alabama code punished slaves for voluntary or involuntary
manslaughter on whites with death, but if a slave committed manslaughter on another slave or
a free black, the law allowed only the infliction of up to 100 stripes and branding in the hand
at the discretion of thejury. Attempted murder of whites and assaults with intent to kill brought
the death penalty." FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 25.
111. The Arkansas constitution guaranteed that "any slave who shall be convicted ofa capital
offence, shall suffer the same degree of punishment as would be inflicted on a free white
person, and no other...." However, this provision had a severely limited meaning. Convicted
and sentenced to death for attempted rape, Charles, a slave, appealed claiming that the
constitution forbade the imposition of the death penalty on him when whites did not have to
endure the same punishment. The Supreme Court of Arkansas rejected his argument, finding
that the constitution did not deprive the state of the power to discriminate against slaves.
According to the court, "The provision was doubtless inserted in the constitution from a feeling
of humanity towards the unfortunate African race, and in order to secure them against that
barbarous treatment and excessive cruelty which was practiced upon them in the earlier period
of our colonial history." Charles v. State, 11 Ark. 390, 405 (1850) (citing ARu. CONsT., art. I,
§ 25).
Historian George M. Stroud catalogued 68 capital crimes that Virginia slaves could commit,
none of which were similarly punished for white offenders. STROUD, supra note 108, at 170-74.
In Alabama, although it was not mandatory, whites could suffer death upon committing treason,
first degree murder, or aiding and abetting a slave insurrection. On the other hand, slaves in
Alabama suffered, without exception, the death penalty for approximately 17 offenses, ranging
from insurrection to robbery (as well as being accessories before the fact for any of these
crimes). STROUD, supra note 108, at 178-79. In South Carolina, whites could commit 27 capital
offenses while slaves were subject to death for 36 offenses. STROUD, supra note 108, at 183.
In 1811, Kentucky slaves could be put to death for conspiracy to rebel, administering poisons
with intent to kill, voluntary manslaughter, and the rape of a white woman. By 1852, various
legislatures had expanded the list to include arson, shooting at or wounding a white person with
intent to kill, robbery, voluntary manslaughter while in the process of committing a felony, and
attempting to destroy bridges or locks. IVAN McDOUGLE, SLAVERY IN KENTUcKY, 1792-1865, 38
(1970).
As stated by Stroud, "In general, therefore, death has been resorted to as the only
punishment, according to the sentiments of slave-holders, adapted to a state of slavery, for all
offences except those of a trivial nature." STROUD, supra note 108, at 187-88.
112. F)LANIGAN, supra note 96, at 25-26.
113. FLANIGAN, supra note 96, at 25-26.
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was a separate offense, reflecting the significance of that particular
crime in slaveholding society.114  Thus, although it was important
that slaves were not punished by dismemberment or torture for
noncapital crimes, the increase of capital offenses during the
nineteenth century greatly outweighed the beneficial effects of other
reforms in criminal punishment.
C. Postbellum
For most people of African descent, formal emancipation followed
Lee's surrender at Appomattox, in April 1865. The defeat of the
Confederacy meant freedom for over four million slaves."' Ironical-
ly, emancipation found freed women empty handed, without home,
land, tools, or other necessary resources. 7 Free blacks were at the
bottom of the social order by every demographic measurement.
Historian Dorothy Sterling observed, "Disenfranchised, denied
employment, excluded from schools, they had the lowest incomes and
the highest mortality rates in the region. Yet, they survived, having
developed the tools for survival under the stress of slavery."18
African American women's subordination continued after eman-
cipation. Lacking literacy, employment and the franchise,
discrimination and terrorism forced most black women to assume
roles much like those they had assumed during slavery. Nevertheless,
the number of black women in the work force remained dispropor-
tionately higher than the number of white women. Most freed
women worked as sharecroppers, tenant farmers, washerwomen, or
wage laborers."9 Although they obtained greater control over their
114. "Mississippi, for example, decreed the death penalty for poisoning wells, cisterns, and
reservoirs as well as the master's food or drink. FIANIGAN, supra note 96, at 25-26 (citing Ala.
Code, Pt. 4, Tit. 1, Ch. 2, Art. X, Sec. 3312,3314; State v. Stephen, 15 Ala. 534 (1849); Bob v. State,
29 Ala. 20 (1856); Henry v. State, 33 Ala. 389 (1859); The Revised Code of the Statute Laws of
the State of Mississippi (Jackson, 1957), ch. 33, sec. 10). See infra Part B, III, D, this text.
115. For some, emancipation predated the Civil War, dating back to colonial times. For
example, in 1800, there were 47,000 free blacks living in the North, most having been freed
after the American Revolution and by 1860, there were 225,000 free blacks in the North.
Slavery, however, did remain in New York State until 1827 and in NewJersey until 1846. As of
1850, there were 236 slaves in the North, as reported in the census. Sterling, supra note 83, at
87, 213.
116. "In 1790 there had been less than 700,000 slaves. By 1830 there were more than two
million .... At the last census before the Civil War, the slave population had grown to
3,953,760 .... The increase of the slave population to virtually 4 million persons by 1860 is an
eloquent testimony to the extent to which slavery had become entrenched in the Southern states
in the nineteenth century." JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, FROM SlAVERY TO FREEDOM 185-86 (1967).
117. Sterling, supra note 83, at 331 (discussing how most freedwomen worked as
sharecroppers, tenant farmers, or wage laborers and how only a few were able to buy land).
118. Sterling, supra note 83, at 87.
119. Sterling, supra note 83, at 87.
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lives, freedwomen were scarcely better off economically than they had
been as slaves.120
African American women's work was central to family survival,
either as the sole or contributing source of family income.' 2 ' Where
black women's employment opportunities were limited, in contrast,
employment opportunities for white women had broadened after the
war. Many white women began to work in factories or as clerks in
stores and business offices.12 2 Moreover, freedwomen were paid less
than freedmen.'2 3
After the passage of the Reconstruction Acts, black men were
empowered to vote and to hold political office. Despite this,
neither black nor white women were yet allowed to enjoy either
change in the laws. Indeed, in five Southern states black men were
a majority of the electorate." Whites responded to burgeoning
black political power with organized violence against freedmen and
women.126 The Klan terrorized and brutalized black politicians and
their families, as well as, other emancipated blacks.'27 As Frederick
Douglass reproved:
You say you have emancipated us. You have; and I thank you for
it. But what is your emancipation? ... [W]hen you turned us
loose, you gave us no acres. You turned us loose to the sky, to the
storm, to the whirlwind, and, worst of all you turned us loose to
the wrath of our infuriated masters.
1 28
Abject living conditions, limited employment opportunities and
terrorism prompted an extraordinary migration among blacks in the
spring of 1879. The "Exodusters" included hundreds of black families
who sought safety and better opportunities in midwestern and
northern states. 29
120. Sterling, supra note 83, at 87.
121. WHrE, supra note 84, at 163-64.
122. WHITE, supra note 84, at 164.
123. On one Georgia plantation, for example, freedmen laborers received $140 a year while
freedwomen laborers received from $60 to $85. Sterling, supra note 83, at 328.
124. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by
the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude."
U.S. CoNsT. amend. XV, § 1.
125. Sterling, supra note 83, at 344.
126. One month after Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act over President Andrew
Johnson's veto, leading southerners met in Nashville to draw up a constitution for the Klu Klux
Klan. Sterling, supra note 83, at 344.
127. Sterling, supra note 83, at 344-50.
128. FREDERICK DOUGLASS, P ace to THE TROUBLE THEY SEEN: THE STORY OF RECONSTRUC-
TION IN THE WORDS OF AFRICAN AMERICANS xix (Dorothy Sterling ed., 1994).
129. For example, by 1880, over 15,000 black migrants were at work on the farms and in the
towns of Kansas. Sterling, supra note 83, at 372.
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In the postbellum period, former slave owners used violence to
express their frustrations. Black women were beaten for attempting
to protect their children or when they asserted themselves in the
mildest way."S They were beaten when they were late to work or
failed to perform to their employer's satisfaction.131 They were
abused whether they cohabited with their boss or rejected his
advances. 32 Sometimes freedwomen were punished for complain-
ing to the Freedmen's Bureau concerning their mistreatment.1,33
D. Crime as Resistance
Any discussion of antebellum and postbellum crime must involve an
analysis of crime as a means of black resistance to slavery and post-
slavery subordination. Black women were not highly represented in
fugitive slaves numbers. Seventy-seven percent of the runaways
advertised in colonial South Carolina during the 1730s were men, a
pattern which persisted throughout the century."4  Some of the
reasons why women were underrepresented in the fugitive population
had to do with restricted mobility associated with childbearing and
childrearing responsibilities.13 5 Nevertheless, black women did resist
their enslavement. Some engaged in direct acts of resistance, such as
the murder of masters, arson, and the refusal to be whipped.3
Other acts of resistance included shoddy workmanship, cruelty to
animals, work slowdowns, and running away.
37
Other forms of resistance included feigning illness, controlling
reproductive functions, and inducing abortions.'M The use of
poison was particularly well suited to women's resistance because of
their duties as cooks and nurses on the plantation. In 1755, a
130. Sterling, supra note 83, at 333.
131. Sterling, supra note 83, at 333.
132. Sterling, supra note 83, at 334-35.
133. Sterling, supra note 83, at 336.
134. South Carolina was not unique. The 1,500 newspaper advertisements published in
Williamsburg, Richmond, and Fredericksburg, Virginia, from 1736 to 1801 revealed much the
same pattern. Of the runaways whose sex could be discerned, 1,138 were men, while only 142
were women. The same pattern existed in antebellum Huntsville, Alabama, where, between
1820 and 1860, of the 562 fugitives advertised, 473 were listed as male and only 19% of the
runaway ads described women. In 1850, 31.7% of the runaways advertised for in New Orleans
newspapers were women. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 70 & nn.25-29.
135. Many slave women between 16 and 35 years old, the age bracket of most runaways, were
often either pregnant, nursing an infant, or were caring for at least one small child. WHrrE,
supra note 84, at 70.
136. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 77-78.
137. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 71-77.
138. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 79-86. For example, an 1869 South Carolina court case
revealed that a slave woman sold as "unsound" and barren in 1857 had three children after
emancipation. WHMrE, supra note 84, at 85.
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Charleston slave woman was accused of poisoning her master and was
burned at the stake." 9 Similarly, a special issue of the South Carolina
Gazette, in 1769, reported that a slave woman had poisoned her
master's infant child."a As Professor Deborah Gray White states,
"[N]o one will ever know how many slave owners and members of
their families were poisoned."1
41
Arson, a capital offense for slaves in almost every state, was uniquely
suited to slave resistance. Female slaves, who committed very few
capital crimes in nineteenth century Virginia, constituted almost one-
third of the convicted arsonists." In 1681 the state of Massachu-
setts tried a slave named Maria and two male slaves for attempting to
set fire to their master's home. As punishment, one of the men was
hanged and the other banished." The Puritan Court, however,
judged Maria's crime as more serious than arson. The court found
that "she did not have the feare of God before her eyes" and that her
action was "instigated by the devil."" Maria was burned at the
stake.
45
The act of insurrection became an issue of importance during this
period. State legislatures acknowledged its importance by dispensing
with the normal waiting period between the guilty verdict and the
execution. For example, in 1708, four slaves were executed for killing
seven whites in Newton, Long Island. Of the four slaves, the three
men were hanged, the one woman was burned at the stake. 46 In
1712, twenty-three male and female slaves engineered a major revolt
in New York City in which they armed themselves with guns and
knives and set fire to a slaveholder's house.1 47 In 1732, the dis-
covery of a slave plot in Louisiana resulted in the hanging of a black
woman and the "breaking on the wheel"" of four of her male co-
conspirators. In 1741, a slave named Kate and a black boatswain
139. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 79.
140. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 79.
141. WHrrE, supra note 84, at 79.
142. FLANICAN, supra note 96, at 48 & Table I.
143. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 39.
144. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 39.
145. Similarly, in 1766 a slave woman in Maryland was executed for setting fire to her
master's home, tobacco house, and outhouse, burning them all to the ground. The prosecutor
in the case noted that there had been two other houses full of tobacco burnt "in the country
this winter." GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 39.
146. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 39.
147. They were ultimately subdued, although after substantial injury and death. Among
those arrested was a slave woman who was visibly pregnant. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 40.
148. GEORGE RYLEY SCoT, A HISTORY OF TORTURE (1940 & reprinted in 1994). "Breaking
on the wheel" was a European form of punishment in which a person was strapped to a large
wheel, too large for their frame, and the wheel was turned until their bones broke.
149. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 40.
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were convicted of trying to bum down the entire community of
Charlestown, Massachusetts. 5 ' Like Maria, Kate was singled out for
having a "malicious and evil intent."'
African American women also resisted white oppression by
defending themselves in the courts. Eliza Gallie's case demonstrates
the systematic violations of African American women's legal rights.
According to Lebsock:
In November 1853, Eliza Gallie, a free black woman of Petersburg,
[Virginia] was arrested and charged with stealing cabbages from the
patch of Alexander Stevens, a white man. She was tried in mayor's
court and sentenced to thirty-nine lashes. There was nothing
unusual in this; free black women were frequently accused of petty
crimes, and for free blacks as for slaves, whipping was the punish-
ment prescribed for by law. What made the case a minor spectacle
was that Eliza Gallie had resources, and she fought back. She filed
an appeal immediately, and two weeks later she hired three of
Petersburg's most eminent attorneys and one from Richmond as
well. "If the Commonwealth, God Bless her, has not met her match
in Miss Liza," a local newspaper commented, "it won't be for lack
of lawyers." The case came up in hustings court in March
1854.152
Gallie was pronounced guilty and sentenced to twenty lashes on her
bare back at the public whipping post. At first, she considered
another appeal, but deciding that the case was hopeless, dismissed her
lawyers and took her punishment. 5 3
Historian Suzanne Lebsock notes that, while this case was unusual,
it reflects the contradiction inherent in the "historic" cultural image
of the African American woman, observing:
Eliza Gallie was relatively speaking, a powerful woman, propertied,
autonomous (divorced actually), and assertive. But she was helpless
in the end, the victim of the kind of deliberate humiliation that for
most of us is past imagining. So it is with our perception of the
history of Black women as a group. On the one hand, we have
been told that Black women, in slavery and afterward, were a
formidable people, "matriarchs," in fact. And yet we know that all
along Black women were dreadfully exploited. Rarely has so much
power been attributed to so vulnerable a group.5 4
150. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 39.
151. GIDDINGS, supra note 88, at 89.
152. SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A
SOUTHERN ToWN, 1784-1860 87-88 (1984).




IV: AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN'S EXPERIENCES IN PENAL
INSTITUTIONS
Numerous studies have documented the historical trend of
incarcerating disproportionately large numbers of African Americans
and treating them harshly.'55 However, because these studies have
seldom made distinctions by sex, as well as race, they frequently have
ignored differences between black male and female prisoners and
significant differences between black and white women. Partiality was
extended mainly to whites. Chivalry filtered white women out of the
prison system, helping to create even greater racial imbalances among
female prisoner populations. As notes women's prison historian
Nicole Rafter, "partiality toward whites contributed to development of
a bifurcated system, one track custodial and predominantly black, the
other reformatory and reserved mainly for whites.""5 6
Convicted female offenders seldom faced the same consequences
as male offenders though women were convicted and imprisoned
under the same statutory provisions. Between the Civil War and
World War I, however, ten states enacted legislation establishing
separate facilities for convicted female criminants15 7 These statutes
also established the use of indeterminate sentencing for women
offenders.1m
The reformatory ideal embodied the notion that women criminals
should be "rehabilitated" rather than "punished."'59 It followed,
therefore, that women should be detained in the institution for as
155. See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 28, at 3 (stating that 23% of black men in the
age group 20-29 is either in prisonjail, on probation, or parole on any given day compared to
6.2% of white men. For women, the statistics are: 2.7% of black women as compared to 1% of
white women).
156. NICOLE H. RAFTER, PARTIAL JUSTICE : WOMEN, PRISONS, AND SOCIAL CONTROL 155
(1990).
157. These ten states were Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, NewJersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin. By 1915 the other nine states (Alabama, Nebraska,
Oregon, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Michigan, North Carolina, and Rhode Island) enacted
similar legislation. Mark C. Clements, Comment, Sex and Sentencing, 26 SW. Lj. 890, 891 (1972)
(citing Rogers, A Digest of Laws Establishing Reformatories for Women in the United States, 8 J. CRIM.
L. & CRuMINOLOGY 518, 520 (1917)).
158. This trend originated around 1869, when Indiana became the first state to establish a
separate reformatory for women. Prior to 1869, women prisoners were incarcerated in the same
countyjails and penitentiaries that housed male convicts. Seven of the 10 states used solely an
indeterminate sentence, two used both the determinate and the indeterminate, and one gave
the trial judge discretion to use either. Carolyn Engel Temin, Discriminatory Sentencing of Women
Offenders: The Argument for ERA in a Nutshell, 11 AMER. CRIM. L. Ray. 355, 358 (1973) (citing
Rogers, A Digest of Laws Establishing Reformatories for Women in the United States, 8J. CaLM. L.C. &
P.S. 518,526 (1917)). Seediscussion of indeterminate and determinate sentencingscheme, infra
Part C, 1, A & B, this text.
159. Id. at 358.
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long as necessary to achieve the desired level of "rehabilitation."16
In order to accomplish this, the statutes which established these
"rehabilitative homes" also contained special sentencing provisions
which applied only to the women sentenced to the particular
institution.' Because most of the statutes required all women over
sixteen years old convicted of a crime to be sentenced to the
reformatories, sex-based differential sentencing resulted.16 2 The
sentencing statutes, therefore, often resulted in women getting longer
sentences than men. Indeed, in the early twentieth century, it was
thought that the ideal sentence to a women's reformatory should be
"indeterminate with no limits at all on the minimum and maximum
terms that an inmate could be forced to serve."'6
This type of disparate sentencing scheme was exemplified by the
Muncy Act of Pennsylvania." It required that all women over the
age of sixteen who had been convicted of an offense punishable by
more than one year imprisonment, be given a general sentence to
Muncy. If the offense was punishable by a term of three years or less,
they could be confined for three years. If the crime called for a term
longer than three years, then the maximum punishment prescribed
by law for the offense was the maximum sentence." The judge
possessed neither the discretion to impose a shorter maximum
sentence than the maximum provided by law nor the power to fix a





163. Most states put some limit on the maximum sentence-usually the maximum term
prescribed by law for the particular offense. Temin, supra note 158, at 358-59 (citations
omitted).
164. In 1913, Pennsylvania created the State Industrial Home for Women by the Act ofJuly
25, 1913, P.L. 1311. It was known colloquially as the "Muncy Act," after the geographical
location of the institution. Temin, supra note 158, at 359.
165. Temin, supra note 158, at 359.
166. As noted by Carolyn Temin, the sentencing laws of Pennsylvania discriminated against
women in at least five ways:
1) They permitted a court to send a woman to Muncy for three years even if the
maximum for the offense was less than three years, whereas a man could not be
sentenced to more than the maximum punishment prescribed by law;
2) They mandated that women receive the maximum legal penalty if convicted of a
crime punishable by more than three years, whereas a man could be sentenced to less
than the maximum prescribed by law;
3) A woman was not to receive any minimum sentence, whereas a man was to have
a minimum sentence not to exceed one-half of the maximum sentence imposed in
those cases where the judge in his discretion could impose a flat sentence stating a
maximum only.
4) Under Pennsylvania law, where a sentence is imposed for less than two years, the
sentencingjudge also had parole jurisdiction; whereas, if the sentence imposed is two
[Vol. 4:1
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By contrast, the Pennsylvania statute for sentencing male offenders
allowed the judge to sentence offenders to shorter periods than the
maximum prescribed by law. In addition, the judge was required to
set a minimum sentence of not longer than one-half of the actual
maximum sentence. 167  Where the statute prescribed "simple
imprisonment," the judge could impose a flat maximum term
provided by law for the offense."
Statutes similar to the Muncy Act remained in effect in several
jurisdictions until fairly recently such as those in Massachusetts, 169
New Jersey"0 and Connecticut.17 1 Iowa law permitted women to
be confined up to five years for a misdemeanor, 72 whereas men
years or more, jurisdiction to parole lay exclusively with the parole board. Since all
sentences to Muncy were for more than two years, they came under the jurisdiction of
the parole board. A person sentenced to less than two years could engage a lawyer to
present and argue a petition for parole on his behalf. The inmate also could present
witnesses and enjoy the full panoply of due process rights. On the other hand, the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, made its decisions in closed sessions and
did not permit representation by counsel at its hearings.
5) Under Pennsylvania law, where a statute prescribes "simple imprisonment" the
sentence must be served in the county jail rather than in a state correctional
institution. Under the Muncy Act, only women sentenced for offenses punishable by
one year or less were eligible to serve their sentences in the countyjail. There are very
few such offenses in the Pennsylvania criminal code. Therefore, many women ended
up in a penitentiary (i.e. Muncy) for offenses which would have sent a man merely to
the countyjail.
Temin, supra note 158, at 358.
This effect of Muncy was declared unconstitutional in Commonwealth v. Stauffer, 214 Pa. Super.
113, 251 A.2d 718 (1969) (holding that the statute providing for those sentenced to simple
imprisonment to be held in county jail precluded the Defendant from being sentenced to the
State Correctional Facility at Muncy). This cite refers to the list of five factors above as well as
the sentence about Commonwealth v. Stauffer. See Temin, supra note 158, at 359-61 (noting that
"In Pennsylvania the county jail is preferable to Muncy because of its location and other less
tangible reasons which make 'county time' less onerous to serve. A person incarcerated at
Muncy is almost always cut off from her relatives and friends.").
167. Temin, supra note 158, at 359.
168. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 1057 (1964). "Wherever any person is convicted of any crime
punishable by simple imprisonment, the court may, in its discretion, pronounce a sentence
either for a fixed term or for a indefinite term, as may seem proper... in no case to exceed
the maximum term prescribed by law...."
169. 1 MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 125, § 16 (West 1958). "The Massachusetts Correctional
Institution, Framingham shall be the institution of the commonwealth where all females
convicted of crimes... shall be imprisoned and detained."
170. NJ. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-155 (West 1964) (repealed 1979). "The several courts in
sentencing to the women's reformatory shall not fix or limit the duration of the sentence ...
but the time which the prisoner shall serve in the reformatory or on parole shall not exceed five
years ... or the maximum term provided by law for the offense ....
171. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 18-65 (West Supp. 1974). "Women over sixteen years of age
who have been ... convicted of, or who plead guilty to, the commission of felonies; second,
persons convicted of, or who plead guilty to, the commission of misdemeanors; ... third,
women sentenced to community correctional centers.... The Court imposing a sentence on
offenders of any class shall not fix the term of such commitment... ."
172. IOWA CODE ANN. § 245.7 (West 1969) (repealed 1985). "... . A female convicted of a
crime less than a felony shall not be detained therein longer than five years under one
commitment."
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could only be imprisoned for a maximum of one year unless
otherwise stated in the statute defining the offense.17 In Maine,
women between the ages of seventeen and forty could be sentenced
to reformatories for up to three years even if the maximum punish-
ment for the offense was less. 174 Men, on the other hand, could
only receive such treatment between the ages of seventeen and twenty-
six."7 Maryland permitted judges to sentence women convicted of
crimes punishable by three months imprisonment to the state
women's reformatory for an indeterminate period not to exceed the
maximum term of imprisonment provided by law.
1 76
Attacks on such sentencing statutes failed because the courts
consistently held that gender-based differential sentencing was
constitutional on the ground that women constituted a reasonable
class for discriminatory treatment in sentencing statutes. 177 Courts
justified legislative distinctions which imposed longer sentences on
women than men as reasonable in view of the state's purpose of
providing more effective rehabilitation for women. 78 The Superior
Court of Pennsylvania, for example, found "the inherent physical and
psychological differences between men and women" to be persuasive:
This court is of the opinion that the legislature reasonably could
have concluded that indeterminate sentences should be imposed on
women as a class, allowing the time of incarceration to be matched
to the necessary treatment in order to provide more effective
rehabilitation. Such a conclusion could be based on the physiologi-
cal and psychological make-up of women, the type of crime
committed by women, their relation to the criminal world, their
role in society, their unique vocational skills and pursuits and their
reaction as a class to imprisonment, as well as the number and type
173. IOWA CODE ANN. § 687.7 (West 1950). "Every person who is convicted of a
misdemeanor, the punishment of which is not otherwise prescribed by any statute of this state,
shall be punished by imprisonment in the countyjail not more than one year, or by a fine not
exceeding five hundred dollars...."
174. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 853-54 (West 1968) (repealed 1975). "When a woman
is sentenced to the Reformatory for Women, the court imposing the sentence shall not fix the
term of commintment to the reformatory. The duration of the commitment... may not exceed
three years."
175. Id. § 802.
176. MD. CODE ANN., (Criminal Law) art. 27, § 689(e) (1994). "... the Courts of this State,
instead of imposing sentences of fixed duration upon female offenders, may sentence them to
the Maryland Correctional Institution for Women-Jessup for an indeterminate period of time
which may not exceed the maximum term of imprisonment provided by the statute...."
177. Pennsylvania v. Daniel, 210 Pa. Super. 156, 162 (1967), rev'd 243 A.2d 400 (Pa. 1968)
(detailing the Muncy Act, which stated that women were to be treated differently than men for
sentencing purposes).
178. Id. at 164 (stating that "this court is of the opinion that the legislature reasonably could
have concluded that indeterminate sentences should be imposed on women as a class ... in
order to provide more effective rehabilitation").
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of women who are sentenced to imprisonment rather than given
suspended sentences.17
9
Although a number of state legislatures revised previously
discriminatory sentencing provisions, for African American women,
sentencing schemes remained discriminatory in intent and effect. 8 °
Prior to 1865, black women entered the prisons of the Northeast and
Midwest in numbers grossly disproportionate to their representation
in the general populations of these regions.'8' In the South,
however, few blacks of either sex were held in state prisons before the
Civil War. 2 Thus in the South, as in the North, though with
opposite effects, racism played an important role in determining the
composition of prison populations in the antebellum period. 8 3
After the Civil War, the prisons of the Northeast and Midwest
continued to be filled with blacks while the formerly white Southern
prisons increased their black population greatly." Even the
emerging prison system of the West imprisoned blacks in proportions
that far exceeded their small representation in the general popula-
tion."  Historically, fewer black women were imprisoned than
either black or white men, but black women were often imprisoned
in greater proportions of the female prisoner population than were
black men in the male prisoner population.18 6 For example, the
data shows that significantly greater proportions of black women than
black men appeared in the 1880 prisoner census for the Midwest and
South; in the 1904 prisoner census, this pattern appeared in all
regions, and it continued to appear in the South in 1923.18
Between 1797 and 1801, 44% of the women sentenced to NewYork's
prison were black, compared to 24% of the men." At the Ohio
penitentiary in 1840, 49% of the female convicts, but only 10% of the
179. Id. (ordering the four year sentence of a woman convicted of robbery vacated in favor
of an indeterminate sentence).
180. For example, Arkansas originally permitted women misdemeanants to be sentenced to
confinement in the women's penitentiary, whereas only male felons could be so confined. This
was changed in 1971 specifically because it discriminated against women. 1939 Ark. Acts 117,
§1, at 270; ARK. CODE ANN. § 46-804 (Michie Supp. 1971). Discriminatory statutes also were
repealed by the legislatures of Kansas and Ohio. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4601 et seq. (Supp.
1970); OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § § 5145.01, 5143.23 (Anderson 1970).
181. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 131.
182. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 131. See also supra Part A, III, C, this text.
183. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 131 (explaining that blacks in the South were disciplined by
their owners rather than through the penal system as they were in the North).
184. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 131-32.
185. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 132.
186. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 141 & Table 6.3.
187. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 141 & Table 6.3.
188. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 141 & Table 6.3.
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males, were black. 89 Of the men held in 1868 at the Tennessee
penitentiary, 60% were black in contrast to 100% of the women.'10
Prison historian Nicole Rafter's research of women in prison
documents the historically disproportionate numbers of African
American women in U.S. penal institutions. Studying the internal
records of five institutions after the Civil War, Rafter found that in all
cases except the Albion reformatory, the number of blacks incarcerat-
ed was disproportionately large.'
Only at New York's Albion reformatory was the number of black
female prisoners proportionate to the state's black population." 2
Albion primarily focused on petty criminals who seemed likely to
respond to rehabilitation, unlike reformatories in other states that
accepted felons and misdemeanants and put little effort into
retraining.'93 It seems that African American women were not
perceived as likely to be rehabilitated, as Albion's prisoner registries
allocated no space for recording race, while leaving space for entries
on a large number of variables (including family history of insanity
and epilepsy)."
Racism was most obvious in southern criminal justice systems. After
the Civil War, in addition to white legislators passing laws directed
against blacks, justice officials sought to increase state revenues by
leasing convicts to private contractors. 95 Black men and women
constituted the overwhelming majority of those affected by these
efforts. Indeed, in the period 1865-1900 for example, southern
contractors leased black female prisoners to farm and mine alongside
black men.19 As a function of the screening out of white female
189. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 141 & Table 6.3.
190. RAFrER, supra note 156, at 141 & Table 6.3.
191. Over 70% of women committed to the Tennessee penitentiary in the 1860-1887 period
were black; this figure rose to over 90% at the turn of the century, when racial tensions ran
especially high, and declined to only 65% by 1926-1934, the final sampling period. Over the
period 1860 to 1930, the number of blacks in Tennessee fell from 26% to 18% of the total
population. The proportion of black women held at New York's State Prison for Women at
Auburn rose from 12.5% at the start of the sampling period to nearly 40% at its close, a period
during which the number of blacks in New York increased from 2% to 3% of the total
population. Similarly, the population of Ohio as a whole rose from 2% to 5% black in the
period 1890-1930, but the proportion of black women in its penitentiary increased steadily from
26% to nearly 52%, and blacks constituted over 25% of the population of the Ohio reformatory
from the time it opened. The institutions studied were Tennessee State Penitentiary, Auburn
(New York) State Prison, Ohio Penitentiary, Albion (New York) Reformatory, and Ohio
Reformatory for Women. RAFTER, supra note 156 at 132 and Table 6.1.
192. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 132 and Table 6.1.
193. RAFrER, supra note 156, at 132 and Table 6.1.
194. In later years, the clerk penciled "colored" at the top of the page when black women
were admitted. RAFIER, supra note 156, at 132.
195. RAFrER, supra note 156, at 134.
196. RAFTER, supra note 156.
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offenders, judges sometimes refused outright to send white women to
penal institutions; however, little concern was paid to the incarcera-
tion of black women. For many white women, then, gender and race
interacted to keep their numbers in state prisons low.
97
Clearly, black women did not benefit from the "chivalry" extended
to white females. A North Carolina report of 1922 described one
institution as being so horrible that "the judge refuses to send white
women to this jail, but negro women are sometimes sent."198
Similarly, Eugenia Lekkekerker, a probation prison superintendent,
wrote in 1931 that the high incarceration rate of women of color was
due not only to "strong social (and sometimesjudicial) prejudice" but
also to black women's lack of access to alternatives "such as probation
or private protective work" that channeled white women out of
prisons.199
Racial, gender, and class bias thus influenced both crime rates and
administrative policies in correctional institutions. An examination of
current statistics reveals how much remains unchanged from previous
eras. According to the United StatesJustice Department, the number
of women in state and federal prisons increased from 12,331 to 43,845
from 1980 to 1990; that is an increase of 256%, compared with a
140% increase in the male prison population.2°' The legacy of
these historical biases is discussed in the next section.
PART B. IMAGES, IDEOLOGY, AND AFRICAN AMERICAN
WOMEN'S CRIMINALITY
The legacy of race, gender and class inequality is evident in African
American women's disproportionate representation in arrest and
incarceration rates. Negative cultural images of African American
women based on stereotypes have been central to the problem of
African American women's circumscribed role and limited access to
societal resources and institutions, and have contributed to their
overrepresentation in the criminal justice system. As former prisoner
Antonio Gramsci instructs, ideological hegemony succeeds in
systematically reinforcing cultural stereotypes which are essential in
maintaining the subordination and coercion of disempowered
groups.2"' Thus, a critical function of cultural images is the creation
197. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 134-35.
198. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 134.
199. RAFTER, supra note 156, at 135.
200. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 634-35.
201. SeeANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS OF ANTONIO GRAMScI
(Quintin Hoare & Geoffrey Nowell Smith eds. and trans., 1st ed. 1971).
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of certain perceptions and expectations regarding a group's likelihood
of contributing to and participating in key societal institutions. One
underlying assumption is that certain groups of individuals are
contributing members of society, while others are simply a burden.
In dichotomous thought, one group is deserving, while the other is
unworthy; one group is innocent, the other is guilty; one group merits
alternative sanction, the other deserves harsh punishment.
Negative cultural images have been instrumental in depriving
African American women of opportunities, resources and recognition
of their value as human beings and contributing members of society.
Thus, while the total number of African American women and their
children who live in abject poverty in the United States has dimin-
ished since the late nineteenth century, their relative numbers remain
high. In 1989, 46.5% of African American women who headed
families had incomes below the poverty level.2 2 Studies reveal that
black women have greater relative poverty as children. They also have
greater poverty upon arrest than white female offenders. As a group,
African American women offenders are more often unemployed or
working in low-income jobs, and living below the poverty line.2"' As
a result, black women's involvement in crime is often related to their
responsibility for meeting the economic needs of their families.'
4
Poverty alone, however, does not fuilly explain the over-
representation of African American women in prisons, since white
women comprise a higher proportion of all impoverished women.
05
A popular explanation for differences between African American and
white female criminality centers around the distinctions in their
socialization and gender roles."' As Diane K. Lewis argues more
persuasively, "a key to understanding the overrepresentation of Black
women in correctional institutions and crime statistics lies not in
202. CLAUDETTE E. BENNET, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, No. 480, THE BLACK POPULATION
IN THE UNITED STATES: MARCH 1994 AND 1993 25 (1995).
203. Lewis, supra note 30, at 96.
204. Also, Lewis and Bresler's study of the San Francisco Women's jail, in 1981, found that
while 57% of the black inmates with children were caring for them before incarceration, this
was only true for 15% of white inmate mothers. Similarly, in the San Francisco population, as
a whole, family responsibilities fell more heavily on black women. Although they were only 14%
of the total adult female population, they headed almost half of the female headed families
living in poverty. Lewis, supra note 30, at 97.
205. Lewis, supra note 30, at 96.
206. Theorists argue that according to ethnic cultural dictates, black children are expected
to be assertive, nonconforming, independent, nurturing, expressive emotionally and focused in
personal relationships, regardless of their sex. Since these traits are specialized according to sex
among whites, black women who display them are perceived as more "masculine" (i.e., crime-
prone) than white women, by the dominant culture. LIs, supra note 30, at 98-99.
[Vol. 4:1
CRIME AND SENTENCING
cultural and social differences, per se, but in the dominant society's
reactions to them."2 °7
The dominant ideologies of the slavery era generated some of the
most enduring negative cultural representations of African American
women. Among the planter class of the antebellum South, where
women were subordinate in the gender hierarchy but reaped the
benefits of race and class asymmetry, the "cult of true womanhood"
defined the model woman as "the ideal wife and mother; as good,
passive, delicate, pure, submissive, calm, frail, small, and depen-
dent."0 8 While the male hierarchy enforced the Victorian code of
modesty on white women, it was contrasted by near total disrespect
for African American women.20
9
Two enduring negative images that reflected the prevailing Euro-
American views of African American women during this period were
(1) 'Jezebel," the sexually aggressive, provocative woman governed
entirely by libido; and (2) "Mammy," the religious, loyal, motherly
slave devoted to the care of the slave owner's family.2 0 "The image
of Jezebel was used to explain sexual liaisons between slave owners
and enslaved black women; that is, slave owners attributed these
liaisons to the hypersexuality of the female slave who was purported
to be the aggressor or seducer."2 1' The perceptions of African
American women as promiscuous left them vulnerable to sexual
crimes.2
12
Although Emancipation freed African American women from
slavery, it did not free them from the "Jezebel" or "Mammy" images.
Instead,
[M]ammy became a national symbol of perfect domesticity at the
very time that millions of black women were leaving the cotton
fields of the South in search of employment in the Northern urban
areas. Surely there is some connection between the idea of
207. Lewis, supra note 30, at 99.
208. Leith Mullings, Images, Ideology, and Women of Color, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S. SOCIETY
267 (Maxine Baca Zinn and Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994).
209. Id.
210. Id. at 267. K SUE JWIELL, FROM MAMMY TO Miss AMERICA AND BEYOND: CULTURAL
IMAGES AND THE SHAPING OF U.S. SOCIAL POLICY (1993) at 35-44; WHITE, supra note 84, at 164.
211. JEWELL, supra note 210, at 37.
212. From emancipation through more than two-thirds of the twentieth century, no
Southern white male was convicted of raping or attempting to rape a black woman. Moreover,
African American women had little or no recourse to justice when the perpetrator was black.
When a black man raped a black woman, police consistently reported the crime as "unfounded,"
and in the relatively few cases that reached the courts, the testimony of black female victims was
seldom believed by white juries. WHITE, supra note 84, at 164-65.
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Mammy, the service and domestic jobs readily offered to black
women, and their near-exclusion from other kinds of work.21
Professor Jewell adds, "[A]s a symbol of African American woman-
hood, the image of mammy has been the most pervasive of all images
constructed by the privileged and perpetuated by the mass media.
Although the image of mammy originated in the South during slavery
it has permeated every region of the United States."" 4
Another myth of black womanhood-Sapphire, a domineering
black woman who consumes men-emerged a century after slav-
ery.215 In contrast to the sexual manipulations of Jezebel, Sapphire
emasculates men by the aggressive usurpation of their role. Her
assertive demeanor identifies her with Mammy, but unlike Mammy,
she is devoid of maternal compassion and understanding. Sapphire
is as tough, efficient and tireless as Mammy, but, whereas Mammy
operates within the boundaries prescribed for women, Sapphire
operates within a man's world.216
It long has been recognized that African American women had
limited choices of occupation until after the Civil Rights Movement.
Prior to that time, African American women generally could only
choose to become either a teacher or a domestic. The proportion of
African American women in domestic service jobs continues to be
high, despite increased occupational mobility between 1960 and
1980.217 The harsh reality that confronts many African American
women clearly indicates that race, gender and class places them in
multiple jeopardy to experience adverse consequences from the
interactive effects of race, gender and class discrimination. As
Professor Judy Scales-Trent argues:
Black women also have a strong argument that they are a "discrete
and insular" minority, that they are the object of historical
213. WHITE, supra note 84, at 165.
214. JEWELL, supra note 210, at 37.
215. Sapphire developed from the numerous inaccurate interpretations of black women's
history. The Sapphire myth was adopted in the scholarly work of E. Franklin Frazier and Daniel
P. Moynihan, reflected in their respective matriarchy theses. Apparently, neither Frazier nor
Moynihan could believe that black women could play crucial roles in black families without
dominating men. According to Frazier, "the Negro woman as wife and or mother was the
mistress of her cabin, and save for interference of master or overseer, her wishes in regard to
mating and family matters were paramount." E. FRANKIN FRAZIER, THE NEGRO FAMILY IN THE
UNTED STATES 125 (1939).
The Department of Labor's 1965 study of the black family was based in part on Frazier's work.
Noting that "the fundamental fact of Negro American family life is the often reversed roles of
husband and wife," it found the black woman's role debilitating for black men. U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL AcTION 30-31, 40 (1965).
216. FRAzIER, supra note 215.
217. In 1980, African American women still accounted for 52% of all private household
cleaners and one-fourth of all those employed as maids. JENVELL, supra note 210, at 44.
[Vol. 4:1
CRIME AND SENTENCING
prejudice and stereotypes, and that this prejudice and insularity
affect their ability to use the political processes to protect their
interests. From the colonial period to the present, various state and
private actors have singled them out for treatment different than
meted out to white women or black men. This has resulted in the
creation of a group which is overrepresented among those living in
poverty, and underrepresented among those who influence the
political process. It is a group which carries the degraded statuses
of both blacks and women, and finds its life chances thereby doubly
limited. Any state action which burdens this group should be
subject to at least strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection
Clause. s
For as long as crime statistics have been compiled, crime and
poverty have been linked. Data on social welfare, health, employment
and education make it clear that African Americans experience
material conditions of life that are significantly worse than those faced
by white Americans." 9 In 1991, using the U.S. Department of
Labor's official poverty line, 30.4% of black families had incomes
below the poverty level.22 °
Clearly, crime control priorities and social welfare policies are
intertwined, particularly as they impact upon African American
women's lives. Society readily punishes poor women of color who do
not fit within middle-class images of womanhood. Notably, the
caricature of the black Welfare Queen perpetuates the indelible image
of undeserving African American women, which legitimates govern-
ment policies in the areas of social welfare and criminal justice.2
The reality is that women cannot raise children at minimum
standards of living on existing social welfare programs.22 2 In 1988
and 1990, Kathryn Edin interviewed fifty women (Aid to Families with
Dependent Children recipients) living in Chicago and other areas of
218. Judy Scales-Trent, Blak Women and the Constitution:Finding OurPlace, AssertingOurRights,
24 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 9, 39 (1989).
219. TONRY, supra note 25, at 128.
220. TONRY, supra note 25, at 128 (estimating the percent of children in black single parent
homes headed by women who lived below the poverty level).
221. As Michael Tonry notes, the personification of welfare fraud during the 1976 and 1980
presidential campaigns of former President Ronald Reagan was Linda Taylor, an African
American woman from Chicago who reportedly collected welfare benefits under several aliases.
TONRY, supra note 25, at 10.
222. "In January 1993, not one state provided AFDC benefits for single parent households
of three people that reached the Bureau of Census' 1992 poverty threshold of $11,187 ($932
per month) for a household of that size. The median monthly benefit level nationally was $367,
ranging from $120 and $164 in Mississippi and Alabama respectively to $703 in Suffolk County,
NewYork, and $923 in Alaska (where living costs are the nation's highest). In Mississippi, AFDC
benefits equal 13% of the federal poverty level. In only 14 states did benefits reach even half
of the federal poverty level." TONRY, supra note 25, at 14.
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Cook County, Illinois about their incomes and expenses.223 Each of
the fifty women had outside sources of support, ranging from
unreported jobs, to support from families, to illegal income from
prostitution and drug dealing. Trying to survive, the women reported
that they felt morally entitled to ignore the income-reporting rules
because they could not support their children or improve their and
their children's lives through working.224 Edin and Christopher's
study revealed that women's welfare offenses did not result in lavish
lifestyles. Several of the families escaped absolute deprivation because
of earnings from drug dealing and theft, undisclosed support from
family or boyfriends, unreported minimum-wage jobs, or awards from
an auto accident. The majority of the families:
[d]id without things that almost everyone regards as essential. Half
lived in very bad neighborhoods. Half lived in badly run-down
apartments, where the heat and hot water were frequently out of
order, the roof leaked, plaster was falling off the walls, or windows
fitted so badly that the wind blew through the apartment in the
winter. One in four did without a telephone.... Most said their
food budgets were too tight for fresh fruit or vegetables.225
Because socioeconomic conditions affecting African American
women are the reason for their higher relative offending rates, society
must focus on changing those conditions, rather than continually
scapegoating and overly punishing members of these communities.
As discussed in the following sections, this course has not been taken.
PART C: PUNISHMENT IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY:
MANDATORY SENTENCING, THE "DRUG WAR," AND AFRICAN
AMERICAN WOMEN
I. THEORIES OF SENTENCING
A. Indeterminate Sentencing
Two major theories have developed in the area of sentencing. The
first theory is that offenders should be sentenced to identical terms
for the same offense. 2 6 The second theory is that individualized
223. TONRY, supra note 25, at 151 (citing KATHRYN EDIN AND CHRISTOPHER JENCKS
REFORMING WELFARE, IN RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY (ChristopherJencks ed., 1992)).
224. TONRY, supra note 25, at 151 (citing KATHRYN EDIN AND CHRISTOPHER JENCKS,
REFORMING WELFARE, IN RETHINKING SOCIAL POLICY (ChristopherJencks ed., 1992)).
225. TONRY, supra note 25, at 16.
226. CESARE MARCHESE DI BECCARIA, ESSAYS ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Caesar Bonesana
and Edward D. Ingraham trans., 2d ed. 1793). Professor Beccaria favored identical disposition
of all persons convicted of the same crime.
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disposition is based on the character and personality of the offender.
The second model favors indeterminate sentencing based on the
offender's rehabilitation progress, so that when an offender enters
prison neither the offender nor the sentencing court can project the
length of the term. "In punishment theory, the first position has
classically been called retributivism, but in contemporary discourse it
has been termed the 'desert,' or just deserts'."22
The latter position has been referred to as having utilitarian and
individualistic goals, including general and specific deterrence,
incapacitation and rehabilitation, which aim to "treat" the individual
and secure the future protection of society.22 Indeterminate
sentencing prevailed around the turn of the century and existed in
every state until the late 1970s to early 1980s. Historically, indetermi-
nate sentencing schemes were decidedly biased based on race and
gender.229
B. Determinate Sentencing
Much of the impetus for determinate sentencing has come in
reaction to the alleged failure of the rehabilitation model, the
indeterminate sentence and parole.2' Advocates of determinate
sentencing argue that it ensures equality in punishments by curtailing
the unfettered discretion of trial judges, because all offenders receive
the same punishment for the committed offense.21  Thus, the lack
of proportionality, the extensive disparity, the inability to predict
227. Dean J. Spader, Megatrends in Criminal Justice Theory, 13 AM. J. GRIM. LAW 157, 164
(1986).
228. Id. at 164-65. See also Alan M. Dershowitz, Indeterminate Confinement: Letting the Therapy
Fit the Harm, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 297 (1974) (discussing the extent to which confinement should
be indeterminate and dependent on the ability to treat the prisoner and danger to society if the
prisoner is released and to what extent it should be based on considerations ofjustice and
proportionality).
229. See supra Part A, IV, this text.
230. Seegeneraily FRANCISA. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OFTHE REHABILrATh1E IDEAL: PENAL POLICY
AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981) (discussing the rise and falM of rehabilitation as a principal goal of
sentencing) ;AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMrrrEE, STRUGGLE FORJUSTICE: A REPORT ON CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1971) (discussing disparate findings in indeterminate sentencing);
ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOINGJUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS: REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
FOR THE STUDY OF INCARCERATION 18 (1976) (concluding that "the rehabilitative disposition is
plainly untenable"); MARvIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WIrroUT ORDER (1973)
(arguing that the rehabilitative model of sentencing is both irrational and unfair); NORVAL
MORRIS, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT (1974); Maurice RosenbergJudiciaDiscretion of the Trial
Court, Viewed from Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 635, 663 (1971) (discussing the unreviewed
discretion of the trial judge over various aspects of a case); Developments in the Law-Race and the
Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L REV. 1472 (1988) (asserting that the Supreme Court has been
excessively concerned with protecting the autonomy of the criminal justice system and the
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accurately and the failure of rehabilitation all have led to a wide-
spread discontent with a purely positivistic system of sentencing.
Former Federal District Court Judge Marvin Frankel is widely
credited for spearheading the modem determinate sentencing
movement. 2 2  Judge Frankel recommended the creation of a
sentencing commission and nomenclature-based classification of
crimes having specified presumptive sentences for periods of
imprisonment to accompany each crime category.213 In addition,
the offender would be graded on a scale of limited factors to be
considered in aggravation or mitigation of sentence, such as educa-
tion and employment.21 Since the rehabilitative and indeterminate
sentencing schemes fell into disrepute in the late 1970s and early
1980s, the federal government and at least forty-six states have
enacted sentencing guidelines and mandatory sentencing laws for a
wide variety of crimes.35
In the Federal Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Congress abolished
the United States Parole Commission, created a United States
Sentencing Commission and directed this agency to draft sentencing
guidelines for the federal courts. 236 Although much of the debate
over the efficacy of determinate sentencing schemes has focused on
the federal sentericing guidelines, notable state efforts toward
determinate sentencing reform preceded those of the federal
232. See, eg., FRANKEL, supra note 230; Marvin E. Frankel & Leonard Orland, Sentencing
Cymmissions and Guidelines, 73 GEO. LJ. 225 (1984) (concluding that a sentencing commission
of experts is the best approach to make criminal sentencing rational, fair, and adaptable to
changing circumstances).
233. FRANKEL, supra note 230, at 118-24.
234. FRANKEL, supra note 230, at 111-15.
235. See Kay A. Knapp & Denis J. Hauptly, State and Federal Sentencing Guideline.s: Apples and
Oranges, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 679 (1992) (stating that judges overwhelmingly favor state
sentencing guidelines over federal sentencing guidelines); SANDRA S-ANE-DuBoW, ALicE P.
BROWN, AND ERIK OLSEN, SENTENCING REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND
EFFECT 290-92 (1985) [hereinafter SHANE-DuBow] (describing a state-by-state survey).
236. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1988). The federal guidelines became
effective on November 1, 1987, but many federal judges considered them unconstitutional and
started to apply them only after the Supreme Court upheld their constitutionality 15 months
later in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989) (holding that sentencing guidelines were
not an excessive delegation of legislative power or a violation of separation of powers).
According to Professor Albert Alschuler, "The federal sentencing guidelines reflect a
more ambitious effort to confine discretion than any current state guidelines." Albert A.
Alschuler, The Failure of Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 901,
988 (1991). "The federal sentencing grid has 258 boxes, more than any of the states' schemes."
Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 994 (a) (1) (A) (1988) (detailing guidelines for sentencing in criminal cases
with regard to probations, fines and terms of imprisonment). In addition to extremely narrow
sentencing ranges for every guidelines category, the Sentencing Reform Act allows judges to
depart from the guidelines only when "there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into account by the Sentencing Commission in
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different from that described." 18
U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1985 & Supp. 1994).
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government,1 7 often with harsher results.2" Several states abol-
ished parole, several greatly narrowed the range ofjudicial discretion;
and several promulgated sentencing guidelines, some drafted by
sentencing commissions and others by judges."9 In 1976, the
California Uniform Determinate Sentencing Act abolished the state's
parole board and established statutory presumptive sentences for all
serious offenses.2" In 1980, a Minnesota sentencing commission
enacted Guidelines.24'
In New York, sentencing reform culminated in the "Rockefeller
Drug Laws," mandating long minimum prison sentences for posses-
sion or distribution of various quantities of drugs . 42  The Rockefel-
ler Drug Laws have been called "the most extreme" in the retributive
trend in criminal justice policy.24 The general policy of New York
237. In 1976, California adopted its Uniform Determinate Sentencing Law. See Cal. Penal
Code, §§1170, 3000,3040 (West Supp. 1991) (creatinga presumptive sentence for each statutory
offense, with a narrow range of permissible deviations from the legislative presumption).
Minnesota was the first state to establish a sentencing commission to promulgate guidelines. See
MINN. STAT. ANN.,§ 244.09 (West 1992) (enabling legislation). Many states followed Minnesota's
example, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.310 (West Supp. 1992); 204 PA. CODE §§ 303.1-.9
(1991). By early 1992 at least 13 states had adopted guidelines systems or had established
sentencing commissions to develop sentencing standards. See Knapp & Hauptly, supra note 235,
at 679 (discussing the implementation of guidelines sentencing systems in Florida, Kansas,
Louisiana, Michigan, Minnesota, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Texas, and Washington). See discussion in Gary T. Lowenthal, Mandatory Sentencing
Laws: Undermining the Effectiveness ofDetenminate SentencingReform, 81 CAL. L. REv. 61, 6-64 (1993)
(discussing the skewed result when progressive sentencing guidelines are paired with mandatory
sentencing in criminal law).
238. Sentencing Guidelines and harsh mandatory punishments for drug offenses. U.S.
SENTENCING COMMISSION, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES &
PoLIcv STATEMENTS 71 (1987).
239. See SHANE-DuBow, supra note 235, at 279-92 (summarizing historical trends in sentence
reform and noting that few states assess the import of their reforms); Michael H. Tonry, Real
Offense Sentencing. The Model Sentencing and Corrections Act, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1550,
1551 (1981) (discussing sentencing reforms in various jurisdictions).
240. CAL PENAL CODE, § 1170 (West 1991).
241. MINN. STAT. § 9 (12) (1980). Under the Minnesota scheme, a sentencing judge
consulted a complex grid in order to figure out a defendant's "score." One dimension of the
grid '.as the nature of the crime, ranked from the most heinous, like murder, down to less
serious crimes. Another dimension of the grid was the defendant's "criminal history score," to
determine whether a defendant was a repeat offender. Once the defendant was placed on the
grid, the judge could give the presumptive sentence, or vary the presumptive sentence slightly
by providing a written justification for the departure. LYNNE GOODSTEIN & JOHN HEPBRUN,
DETERMINATE SENTENCING AND IMPRISONMENT: A FAILURE OF REFORM 76-80 (1985).
,The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, unlike the federal guidelines, list aggravating and
mitigating factors without specifying their weight. The guidelines declare that the listed
aggravating and mitigating circumstances as well as unlisted ones may justify departure from the
guidelines' narrow penalty ranges. At the same time, these guidelines forbid departure "unless
the individual case involves substantial and compelling circumstances." Minnesota Sentencing
Guidelines and Commentary § ll.D.2 at 18-20 (1984).
242. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (2) (a) (McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1995).
243. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 411. New York State Penal Law divides felonies into six
classes (from class A-I to class E) which differ progressively in allowable minimum and maximum
sentence lengths. Conviction for a ciass A-I offense, the most serious felony class, carries a
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during the 1960's had been to reserve criminal penalties for higher-
level drug traffickers, while emphasizing drug treatment for low-level
users."1  The Joint Committee notes further that, this approach
being recognized as a failure, "the Governor and New York Legisla-
ture decided to try a new approach: the law was changed to prescribe
severe and mandatory penalties for drug offenses at all levels."2"
The principal purposes of 'the 1973 drug law were to frighten
potential drug offenders with the threat of "get-tough" laws, and to
reduce the amount of addiction-related crime by jailing some
hardened criminals for long periods, thereby preventing them from
committing further crimes.246 If a person is convicted of a Class A
drug felony, by plea or at trial, the judge has virtually no sentencing
discretion under New York's mandatory Rockefeller Drug Laws.
According to the Joint Committee's report:
Punishment became more severe under the 1973 law ... Between
1972 and 1974 under the old law, only three percent of those
convicted and sentenced to prison for drug felonies received a
minimum sentence of more than three years. During 1974 and
1975, when the new law was in effect, 22% received minimum
sentences of more than three years. Under the old drug law,
lifetime prison sentences had been extremely rare: they were
imposed only in cases involving large amounts of drugs. By
contrast, some 1,777 persons convicted under the new drug law
were sentenced to lifetime prison terms (imprisonment plus parole)
between September 1973 and June 1976.24
Guidelines and mandatory minimum punishment schemes had the
ostensibly laudable goal of decreasing racial and other disparities in
criminal sentencing.2 8 While United States Supreme Court Justice
Stephen Breyer was a circuit court judge, he wrote that Congress
mandatory minimum sentence of at least fifteen years and a maximum of life. N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.00 (McKinney 1994). SeeTHE ASSOCIATION OFTHE BAR OF THE CIn' OF NELvYORKAND THE
DRUG ABUSE COUNCIL, THE NATION'S TOUGHEST DRUG LAW: EVALUATING THE NEW YORK
EXPERIENCE 149-51, 155-56 (1977) [hereinafter JOiNT COMMITrEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW
EVALUATION] (describing the law in detail). Further, "[t]he 1973 law instituted an important
difference between the lifetime maximum sentence required for class A drug felonies and the
lifetime maximum mandated for other class A felonies [by providing that] class A drug felons
could never be discharged from parole supervision. Class A drug lifetime sentences were thus
truly for the life of the convicted felon." Id. at 151.
244. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 3.
245. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 3.
246. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 3.
247. JOINT COMMrTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 16.
248. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reaity of Guidelnes Sentendng: No End to Dispat4y, 28 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 161 (1991) (reporting that disparities in federal criminal sentencing persist despite
Congress's goals, in enacting sentencing guidelines and of eliminating disparities).
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enacted the federal sentencing statute in 1984 to serve two goals. 249
The first was to have honesty in sentencing, where the sentence a
judge imposed was the sentence a prisoner served, without being
reduced by parole officers. 25 ' The second goal was to reduce the
huge disparities in sentencing.25 1
The federal sentencing guidelines were designed to limit the
influence of social factors, such as the defendant's education and
employment record, on sentencing determinations.252 The guide-
lines state that family ties and responsibilities, age, employment skills,
emotional conditions, and drug and alcohol dependence, are
generally irrelevant in determining whether a sentence should depart
from the guidelines.25  To reduce racial and class disparities in
sentencing, the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines Commission
provided in its guidelines that education, living arrangements, and
marital status should not be used to justify departures from sentenc-
ing guidelines. 4 As discussed, infra Section III. A-B, however,
measures such as the imposition of harsher penalties for identical
narcotic substances, "crack" and "powdered" cocaine, exacerbated the
gross disparities and disproportionate punishments between African
American and European American defendants.
II. IMPACT OF SENTENCING REFORM ON WOMEN
The severity trend in modem sentencing reform statutes has
resulted in the exponential growth of the federal and state prison
populations, and has had a particularly devastating impact on
communities of color.255 Professor Michael Tonry concluded that
the War on Drugs has caused an increasing black disproportion in the
inmate population.256 Drug arrests are a principal reason that the
proportions of African Americans in prison and more generally under
criminal justice system control have risen rapidly in recent years. 25 7
249. Stephen Breyer, The Federal Sentendng Guidelines and the Key Compromises Upon Wich They
Rest, 17 HOFsTRA L. REv. 1, 4 (1988).
250. Id
251. Id
252. TONRY, supra note 25, at 169 (quoting the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984).
253. TONRY, supra note 25, at 169.
254. TONRY, supra note 25, at 127.
255. TONRY, supra note 25, at 113.
256. TONRY, supra note 25, at 113.
257. "The pattern of increasing Black percentages is apparent in the aggregate national data
on arrests and in state data. [Data on t]he national arrest rates per 100,000 population for
whites and nonwhites from 1965 to 1991... [show that) nonwhite rates were higher than white
rates, usually at least double, throughout that period. From the early 1970s onward, white drug
arrest rates were basically stable, fluctuating around 300 per 100,000. After 1980, nonwhite rates
rose steadily and then skyrocketed: [b]y 1988 they were five times higher than white rates."
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What is most reprehensible about the modem sentencing laws is the
predictability of their disproportionate impact on communities of
color. Professor Tonry asserts that the impact of the War on Drugs
on young, inner-city minority males was foreseeable, and that the drug
war's architects could justifiably be held accountable for the foresee-
able consequences of their policies." Thus, such laws could be
viewed as inherently racist."9
African American women currently represent over forty-five percent
of the women in United States federal prisons.2 This is an alarm-
ing rate since the entire African American population is only fourteen
percent of the United States population.26 Between 1983 and 1993,
the number of women in New York City jails increased from 310 to
2,000; while women in State prisons rose from 610 to 3,553.262
In the twentieth century, as in the past, poverty is the major
correlative in African American women's involvement in criminality.
Two-thirds of offenders sent to prison are convicted of property, drug
and public disorder crimes.263 The median net worth for African
Americans in 1988 was $4,606, less than a tenth of the median net
TONRY, supra note 25, at 110-11 (citing Alfred Blumstein, Making Rationality Relevant: The
American Society of Criminology 1992 Presidential Address, CRIMINOLOGY, Jan. 1993).
258. TONP.Y, supra note 25, at 4.
259. In my view, policymakers' knowledge that the harsh sentencing schemes would have a
devastating and disproportionate impact on mostly poor inner-city communities of color render
the laws inherently racist. Accordingly, one commentator notes that
Although damaging the lives of countless young blacks was probably not their primary
aim, the architects of the War on Drugs no doubt foresaw the result. ... For most
purposes, an action taken to achieve a result is ethically indistinguishable from an
action taken with knowledge that a result will almost certainly occur. In the criminal
law, for example, if death results, setting fire to a house for the purpose of killing the
sleeping occupants is first-degree murder, as is setting fire to a house for the purpose
of defrauding an insurance company, but with knowledge that the occupants will most
likely die....
TONRY, supra note 25, at 4-5. Nevertheless, Tonry argues that the designers of sentencing
guidelines intended to eliminate rather than increase racial disparities in sentencing. TONRY,
supra, note 25, at 127. See also Randall Kennedy, Changing Images of the State: The State, Criminal
Law, and RacialDiscriminatian, 107 HARv. L. REv. 1255 (1994) (criticizing a Minnesota Supreme
Court decision which invalidated a state law prescribing harsher penalties for crack cocaine
possession than for powdered cocaine possession).
260. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS, supra note 27, at 636 (Table 6.97-Type
of Commitment Offense Among Federal Prison Inmates by Sex and Race).
261. ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 17 (1994) (reporting Census Bureau data showing that the
population of blacks in 1992 was 31,635,000 out of total United States population of
225,082,000).
262. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, REPORT ON CHARACTERISTICS OF
NEW COMMITMENTS (1993) [hereinafter CHARACTERISTICS OF NEW COMMrrMENTS).
263. JAMES AUSTIN &JOHN IRWIN, NATIONAL COUNCIL ON CRIME AND DELINQUENCY, WHO
GOES TO PRISON 1 (1990). Larceny remains the number one property offense for women's
arrest. See CHARACTERISncs OF NEW COMMITMENTS, supra note 262, at 8 (reporting higher
percentages of commitments of females for grand larceny and forgery than for other property
offenses).
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worth for white Americans.2" Female-headed households are at
substantially greater risk of poverty. In the United States, 44% of
African American families are headed by single mothers, compared
with 13% of white families.2" The median income for an African
American household headed by a single woman is 38% of that for an
African American married couple."
Another major reason for the increased incarceration of black
women is the nation's "war on drugs." Mandatory and guideline
sentencing laws, particularly those assessing higher penalties for all
levels of drug involvement are having a devastating impact on African
American women who are receiving the severe punishments. Women
are particularly affected by the Rockefeller Drug Laws. While male
drug commitments increased from 32% in 1987 to 43.7% in 1989, the
proportion of the female population imprisoned for drug offenses
rose from 42.4% to 66.4% in the same period. 67
The number of women in custody in New York state prisons
increased 333.9% between 1982 and 1984.2' Between 1988 and
1991, the number of women committed to New York State prisons as
second-felony drug offenders under mandatory sentencing laws
increased 276%, while the number of women committed as first-felony
drug offenders increased 147%.269 In New York, drug offenses
account for over 70% of the women sentenced to prison and 80% of
all women in prison have substance abuse problems. According to
264. Rochelle L. Stanfield, Black Frustration, NAT'LJ., May 16, 1992, at 1162.
265. Id. The 1990 census provides the percentage of each family category by income bracket
based on data from 1989:
BLACKS WHEITS
Fam. Inc. Intact Cpl. Single Fem. Intact Cpl. Single Fern.
Under $5,000 2.2% 21.6% 1.3% 10.9%
$5,000-9,999 7.8 22.4 3.4 15.2
$10,000-14,999 10.2 15.4 6.4 14.1
$15,000-19,999 10.0 11.5 7.4 12.1
$20,000-24,999 9.7 6.9 7.8 10.9
$25,000-34,999 17.3 11.1 16.9 15.5
$35,000-49,999 20.2 6.7 22.1 12.4
$50,000-59,999 8.1 2.1 10.8 3.6
$60,000-74,999 8.3 1.5 10.0
$75,000 and above 6.3 0.9 13.9 2.5
Median Income $30,650 $11,630 $39,208 $18,946
Id.
266. Id.
267. THE CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEvYORK, WOMEN IN PRISON FACr SHEET (1990)
[hereinafter WOMEN IN PRISON FACr SHEET].
268. WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET (1995). All other references to the FACr SHEET will be
to the 1990 edition.
269. Rhea Schaenman, Treatment, NotJai4 Saves Lives and Money, N.Y. TMEs, Feb. 6, 1995, at
16 (letter from the Director of the Women in Prison Project of the Correctional Association of
New York).
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the Correctional Association of New York, the rate of growth in new
court commitments between 1987 and 1989 was approximately three
times greater for women than for men-98.9% for females versus
33.5% for males.7 The growth in both populations is, in large
part, the result of increased commitments for drug offenses. From
January 1987 through December 1989, drug commitments for females
rose 211%, and rose 82% for males.271 Over the three year period,
African American women on average accounted for 46.1% of the
female new court commitment population, followed by Hispanic
women at 36.3 %, and whites at 17.5 %. 272
Incarcerated women (61.2%) were more likely than men (32.2 %)
to be committed for drug offenses.273 Men (53.6%) were more
likely than women (26.1%) to be committed for violent felony
offenses. Black women as a proportion of all female drug commit-
ments increased from about 35% in 1987 to 41% in 1989, while white
women declined from 13.8% to 9.3% in 1989.274
According to the New York State Department of Correctional
Services, most female "inmates report that their offenses involved
cocaine, crack or opiates.... In 1988, 43.3% of women reported that
the drug leading to their conviction was cocaine, and another 30.6%,
specified crack. This self-reported pattern of commitment was
reversed in 1989, with 44.8% of females citing crack, and 33.9%
[citing] cocaine."275 The Department also reports that in 1988,
those incarcerated for either selling or possessing crack in 1988,
49.4% were black, 43.3% Hispanic and 7.3% white. The percentage
of Hispanic [women's] crack admissions in 1989 was nearly identical
to that of 1988, while black [women's] crack admissions were up and
white, down."276 The proportion of women incarcerated from New
York City in 1989 for crack offenses was nearly double the proportion
incarcerated for cocaine offenses (40.7% versus 20.7%). 277
270. WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET, supra note 267 (reporting statistics on NewYork's female
prison population).
271. WOMEN IN PRISON FACT SHEET, supra note 267.
272. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT
POPULATION 1987-1989, at 5 (1990) [hereinafter FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION].
273. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF CORRECTIONAL SERVICES, COMPARISON OF MALE & FEMALE
INMATES UNDER THE DEPARTMENT'S CUSTODY AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1990, at 3 (1990).
Approximately 51% of the total commitments for drug offenses is comprised of Hispanic
women. Black women accounted for another 38%, and whites, the remaining 11%. See also
FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION, supra note 272, at 23.
274. FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION, supra note 272, at 23.
275. FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION, supra note 272, at 25.
276. FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION, supra note 272, at 29.
277. FEMALE DRUG COMMITMENT POPULATION, supra note 272, at 32.
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Many women find themselves incarcerated because they have been
forced or tricked into carrying drugs for dealers." Often the
dealers are boyfriends, spouses or other relatives that use the threat
of retaliation if the women do not agree to carry large amounts of
drugs, frequently across state or national borders. 7 9 These women
are victimized again by the criminal justice system by serving long
sentences for drug possession. Queens County statistics on female A-I
drug defendants are illuminating:
Data... indicate that 115 (70 percent) of these women were sent
to prison between 1986 and 1990. Queens sent more women
charged with A-I drug felonies to state prison than did any other
county in New York during this period. Likewise, Queens sent a
greater proportion of women arrested for A-I drug felonies to prison
than the boroughs of Manhattan, Brooklyn, Bronx or Staten
Island.
28 0
While the Queens County statistics do not report the race of the
female drug couriers charged with A-I felonies, data indicate that
Latina and African American women constituted the overwhelming
majority of women charged with A-1 drug felonies in Queens County
and of those incarcerated between 1986 and September 30, 1991.21
Ill. ANGELA THOMPSON AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT PROPOR-
TIONALITY ANALYSIS
At the sentencing phase of her trial for the sale of 2.3 grams of
"crack" cocaine to an undercover police officer, a class A drug offense
under the Rockefeller Drug Laws, Angela Thompson was originally
sentenced to eight years to life imprisonment 28 2 This sentence was
upheld by a majority of the Appellate Division of the New York
Supreme Court.21 On cross-appeal by the State, however, the New
York Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts and ordered Angela
Thompson to receive the mandatory minimum of fifteen years to life
imprisonment.
278. See CoRRE6CIONAL ASSOCIATION OF NEW YoRK, INJUSTICE WLL BE DONE: WOMEN DRUG
COURIERS AND THE ROCKEFELLER DRUG LAws 2-9 (1992) [hereinafter INJUSTICE WILL BE DONE]
(detailing case histories of women drug couriers).
279. It.
280. Id at 19.
281. Eight percent were white, 40% were black, and 52% were Hispanic. Charges were
dropped against 37% of the white women, 29% of the black women, and 25% of the Hispanic
women. Of the Queens women receiving life prison terms as a result of A-1 drug felony arrests,
6% were white, 24% were black, and 70% were Hispanic. INJUSTICE WILL BE DONE, supra note
278, at 20.
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At the center of the debate over Angela Thompson's case was the
applicability of the Eighth Amendment under both the United States
and New York Constitutions. Thus, this Article now focuses on the
modem rendering of "just deserts theory" and analyzes the Eighth
Amendment as a mandate for proportionate punishment, with
particular attention to the lives of African American women and the
nation's war on drugs. In this respect, Angela Thompson's case must
be viewed in historical light in order to illuminate the struggles of
black women within the criminal justice system.2" As stated earlier,
the fundamental issue to be addressed is whether the drug laws,
mandating life imprisonment and lifetime parole on parole release,
and operating disparately in communities of color, prescribe
sentences so disproportionately severe as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of constitutional limitations.
A. Proportionality Analysis by the Supreme Court
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"[E]xcessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed,
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."2" In the context of
capital cases, the Supreme Court has consistently held that this
provision contains a proscription against disproportionate sentenc-
es. 28 6  In Furman v. Georgia,287 the Supreme Court continued to
apply this analysis to capital cases. A sharply splintered Court
delivered the Furman opinion. The Furman majority emphasized the
arbitrariness of unstructured discretion in the hands of the sentencing
judge. Such subjective judgments constituted cruel and unusual
284. Regina Austin, SapphireBound!, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 539,543-44 (discussingjurisprudential
models for minority feminist legal scholarship).
285. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The NewYork Constitution is nearly identical: "Excessive bail
shall not be required nor excessive fines imposed, nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be
inflicted, nor shall witnesses be unreasonably detained." N.Y. CONS'. art. I, sec. 5.
286. SeeEnmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982) (striking a capital sentence for a felony
murder conviction because the defendant accomplice did "not himself kill, attempt to kill, or
intend that a killing take place"); cf Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137 (1987) (holding that the
death penalty is proportional in felony murder cases where the accomplice's participation in the
felony is "major" and his mental state is one of reckless indifference to human life); Coker v.
Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (holding that the death penalty is grossly disproportionate
to the crime of rape); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's revised death
penalty provisions); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 306 (Stewart, J., concurring), 314
(Marshall,J., concurring) (1972) (bothjustices observing that "excessive" penalties are "cruel"
for Eighth Amendment purposes).
287. 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (5-4 decision). The Court struck down a Georgia death penalty
statute for murder as discriminatory and arbitrary. Justices Brennan and Marshall voted to
reverse the sentences because they found the death penalty to be per se unconstitutional. But
see Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (upholding Georgia's revised death penalty statute).
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punishment, as the recipients of the death penalty become a
"capriciously-selected, random handful."2
By 1976, many state legislatures responded to the Furman decision
by revising their statutes to provide structured sentencing discretion.
In the three cases of Gregg v. Georgia,2 9 Proffitt v. Flofida,29 and
Jurek v. Texas,291 the Supreme Court upheld capital punishment
statutes as revised by Georgia, Florida and Texas. In writing for the
7-2 majority in Gregg,292 Justice Stewart held that the Court may not
"require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so
long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportion-
ate to the crime involved."293  The statutory problems in Furman
were found to be adequately remedied. The arbitrariness concern was
remedied by procedural revisions such as a bifurcated trial-sentence
where the guilt-determination stage was separated from the sentenc-
ing stage. The revised statutes also guided sentencer discretion by
defining aggravating and mitigating circumstances, and mandated
appellate review of all death sentences.29
288. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Following a brief per curiam opinion, each member of the 5-4 majority issued his own
concurring opinion. Justice White found that the infrequence of the imposition of capital
punishment diminished its impact as a deterrent; thus, the death penalty was cruel and unusual
by virtue of its occasional imposition. Id. at 310,312-14. Justice Douglas was concerned that the
death penalty was not only capriciously imposed, but also imposed in a racially discriminatory
manner. Id. at 240, 256-57. Justices Brennan (id. at 3 05) and Marshall (id. at 314, 359) opined
that capital punishment was per se cruel and unusual punishment.
The dissenting opinions of Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and
Rehnquist, differed from the majority on three primary issues. First,Justice Rehnquist criticized
what he perceived to be the majority's judicial activism. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 465
(Rehnquist,J., dissenting). Second, the dissenters insisted that the death penalty did not offend
contemporary standards of humaneness. Id. at 414, 442-43 (opinion of Powell, J.). Third, the
dissenters opined that competentjuries were capable of rendering reasonable decisions even in
the absence of specific statutory guidance. Id. at 375, 400-03 (opinion of Burger, CJ.).
289. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
290. 428 U.S. 242 (1976).
291. 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
292. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
293. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175 (1976). In Gregg, the Court established four
objective criteria for Eighth Amendment analysis: "(1) a bifurcated proceeding where the
penalty was considered separately from the guilt of the defendant; (2) specific standards that
narrowed the class of death-eligible defendants; (3) the consideration of all relevant
information, especially mitigating circumstances, in the penalty phase, and (4) meaningful
appellate review." Olivia 0. Singletary, Comment, Harmelin v. Michigan: The Most Recent
Casualty in the Supreme Court's Struggle to Develop a Standard for Eighth Amendment Proportionality
Review, 54 OHIo ST. LJ. 1205,1209 (1993) (footnote omitted).
294. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1976). Justices Marshall and Brennan dissented,
finding that a punishment may be excessive, and therefore cruel and unusual, even though
there may be public support for it. Id. at 229. The majority opinion noted that whereas 35 state
legislatures had enacted capital punishment legislation, the penalty did not offend contemporary
societal standards. Id. at 179 (dismissing petitioner's argument that standards of decency
required a destruction of capital punishment).
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Gregg emphasized the special character of the death penalty, as
"unique in its severity and irrevocability."" 5 In requiring extensive
procedural safeguards, particularly those involving consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, Greggarticulated the human
dignity principle underlying the Eighth Amendment.29 As such,
the Court upheld the death penalty, but determined that a constitu-
tional violation would occur if punishment were disproportionate in
comparison to the seriousness of the crime.297
Race and imposition of the death penalty have been historically
intertwined.9 ' Challenges to capital punishment based on racial
discrimination have been advanced on Equal Protection Clause and
Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause theories. In McCleskey v.
Kemp, the Supreme Court found the statistical data revealing the
correlation between racial bias and the implementation of the death
penalty in Georgia insufficient to establish a constitutional viola-
tion." The Court rejected McCleskey's Eighth Amendment argu-
ment on the basis that the statistics did not establish that race
governed capital punishment decisions such that the death penalty
law was implemented in an arbitrary and capricious manner."° To
dissenting Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens,
however, the statistical evidence "reveal[ed] that the risk that race
influenced McCleskey's sentence [was] intolerable by any imaginable
standard."30'
While the Court has reluctantly applied proportionality principles
in capital cases, it has much less consistently applied these principles
295. Id. at 187 (citation omitted).
296. Id. at 173 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958)).
297. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976).
298. See, eg., Stephen L. Carter, When Victims Happen to Be Black 97 YALE LJ. 420, 440-47
(1988) (criticizing the McCleskey court's failure to consider the need to protect black victims of
crime); Developments in the Lam-Race and the Criminal Process, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1473, 1603-26
(1988) (describing racial disparities in capital sentencing and possible remedies); Samuel R.
Gross & Robert Mauro, Patterns of Death: An Analysis of Racial Disparities in Capital Sentencing and
Homicide Victimization, 37 STAN. L REv. 27, 54-6 (1984) (reporting statistical evidence of racially
discriminatory imposition of the death penalty); Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, (1988) (arguing for
"community-based" equal protection jurisprudence in capital sentencing that will give black
communities the same protection from crime that white communities enjoy, by eliminating
racial discrimination).
299. 481 U.S. 279 (1987). The Baldus Study was based on more than 2,000 Georgia murder
cases tried in the 1970s. The study revealed that blacks whose victims were white had the
highest probability of receiving the death sentence. Writing for the 5-4 majority, Justice Powell
stated that the Baldus statistics failed to show that "any of the decision makers in McCleskey's
case acted with discriminatory purpose." Id at 297.
300. Id. at 307 (holding that risk of racial prejudice in death penalty cases is small enough
to disallow an Eighth Amendment claim).
301. Id. at 325 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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in the context of noncapital cases." 2 The question as to whether
a term of imprisonment could be so excessively disproportionate to
the offense so as to violate the Eighth Amendment was not addressed
by the Supreme Court until 1892, in O'Neil v. Vermont 3 Nearly
twenty years later, the Supreme Court decided Weems v. United States,
the seminal case with respect to the proportionality principle."°
Weems recognized the applicability of disproportionately analysis to
excessive imprisonment. In Weems, the Court reversed the contested
sentence because of the unusually harsh nature of the punishment
and because it recognized that "it is a precept of justice that punish-
ment for crime should be graduated and proportioned to of-
fense." ' 5 The Court compared the punishment of the defendant
to those imposed in the same jurisdiction for crimes that the Court
considered to be more serious than the one for which the defendant
302. In addition to death penalty cases, proportionality review has been applied in
enforcement of prisoners' rights cases. See e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S. Ct. 1970 (1994)
(holding that rape of pre-operative transsexual by another inmate amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment where prison officials took no precautions despite knowledge that
petitioner would be particularly vulnerable to sexual attack by other inmates); Hudson v.
McMillian, 112 S. Ct. 995 (1992) (holding Eighth Amendment applicable to a prisoner who was
beaten by guards but did not suffer "significant injury"); McCarthy v. Madigan, 112 S. Ct. 1081
(1992) (holding that a prisoner was not required to exhaust administrative appeals before
bringing a federal claim against prison officials for neglecting his medical and psychiatric needs
in violation of the Eighth Amendment).
303. William H. Mulligan, Cruel and Unusual Punishments: The portionality Rule, 47
FoRDHAM L. REv. 639, 642 (1979) (citing O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892)). In O'Nei4
the defendant was licensed to sell liquor in New York, and had been sentenced to serve 19,914
days (over 54 years), for conviction on 307 counts of illegal sale of liquor shipped to Vermont.
The majority did not reach the question of whether the penalty violated the Eighth Amendment
since that point had not been raised as error. Id. at 643 (citing O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 331. The
majority also stated that the Eighth Amendment did not apply to the states. Id. at 642 (citing
O'Neil, 144 U.S. at 332). This view was expressly rejected in 1962 in Robinson v. California, 370
U.S. 660 (1962).
Mulligan notes that in a dissenting opinionJustice Field "considered the fact that the penalty
was more harsh than could have been imposed for burglary or manslaughter, and concluded
that 'it was one which, in its severity, considering the offenses of which [the defendant] was
convicted, may justly be termed both unusual and cruel.'" Id. at 342 (citing O'Neil 144 U.S.
at 339) (Field, J., dissenting).
304. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 362 (citing Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910)).
The Court was construing the Philippines' Bill of Rights which contained a cruel and
unusual punishment clause identical to the language of the Eighth Amendment. The
defendant, an official of the Philippine government, was convicted of falsifying public
records and was sentenced under the Penal Code of the Philippines, then a United
States territory, to fifteen years of hard and painful labor, with a chain at the ankle
hanging from the wrists. He was stripped of the right of parental authority,
guardianship of person or property, participation in the family council, marital
authority, the administration of property, and the right to dispose of his property. He
was placed on surveillance by the state for the rest of his life, and could not vote, hold
office, receive retirement pay, or even change his residence without permission.
Mulligan, supra note 303, at 362 (citing Wens, 217 U.S. at 364-66).
305. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 367.
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had been convicted."°  It also compared the punishment under
attack with those imposed in other jurisdictions for the same
crime."0 7 This two-step comparison constitutes the major part of
the contemporary proportionality test."'8  Weems affirmed two
constitutional principles relevant to Eighth Amendment analysis: first,
the legislature's preeminent role in determining crimes and punish-
ments, a role subject to constitutional limitations;"° and second, the
evolutive nature of the Eighth Amendment."' As Chief Justice
Warren later stated in Trop v. Dues,11 "the [Eighth] Amendment
must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society."
12
Application of the proportionality principle has proven to be erratic
in practice, particularly in noncapital cases. For example, in Rummel
v. Estelle,313 a majority of the Court upheld a legislative determina-
tion of proportionality under a Texas recidivist statute for a defendant
who had been convicted of three nonviolent felonies involving minor
theft of property. 4 In Hutto v. Davis, the Court upheld a forty-year
sentence for the possession of less than nine ounces of marijuana. 5
Despite these prior rulings, in Solem v. Helm,16 the Court overturned
a sentence of life in prison without parole for a defendant convicted
of seven nonviolent felonies as violative of the Eighth Amend-
ment.
3 17
306. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 362 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 380 ) (comparing the penalty
for falsification of documents to the punishments for certain degrees of homicide, and for
"misprision of treason... conspiracy to destroy the Government by force... larceny and other
crimes").
307. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 643 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 380-81 (comparing the
Spanish penal code that prescribed the contested punishment to the United States penal law
penalty for the similar crime of embezzlement).
308. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 643 (citing Hart v. Coiner, 483 F.2d 136, 141-42 (4th Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 983 (1974)); NewYork v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 342 (N.Y.), cert.
denieA 423 U.S. 950 (1975).
309. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 644 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 379).
310. Mulligan, supra note 303, at 644 (citing Weems, 217 U.S. at 378) (noting that the Eighth
Amendment "may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane
justice").
311. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
312. Id. at 101.
313. 445 U.S. 268 (1980).
314. Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263, 285 (1980). The defendant in Rummel was convicted
of obtaining $120.75 by false pretenses and had two prior nonviolent felony convictions, one
involving fraudulent use of a credit card for $80.00 and the other involving passing a forged
check for $28.36. Id. at 265-66.
315. 454 U.S. 370 (1982) (per curiam).
316. 463 U.S. 277 (1983).
317. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277 (1983). The five-member majority in Solem distinguished
Rummel on the grounds that the defendant in that case had the possibility of obtaining parole,
whereas the defendant in Solem was given a sentence with no eligibility for release absent
executive clemency. Id. at 300-03.
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In its most recent statement on proportionality, the Supreme Court
cast further confusion on the applicability of Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence with regard to noncapital offenses. In Harmelin v.
Michigan,"' the defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment
without possibility of parole pursuant to a Michigan statute requiring
such punishment for the possession of more than 650 grams of any
mixture containing cocaine."9 The majority of the Court reaf-
firmed the principle that gross disproportionality of a sentence of
imprisonment violates the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clause."' However, the Court simultaneously dis-
tanced itself from the standards announced in Solem.3 ' The Court
was sharply divided on the issue of whether Harmelin's life sentence
constituted cruel and unusual punishment"32  In writing for the
plurality, Justice Scalia's opinion affirmed the Michigan Court of
Appeals' decision upholding the sentence. Two members of the
Court, however, voted to affirm because they found no Eighth
Amendment proportionality requirement applicable to noncapital
sentences . 23 Three members voted to affirm because, based on the
severity of the crime of cocaine distribution, the sentence was
constitutional under the narrow proportionality test that they
concluded was applicable to noncapital sentences.3 24  The four
dissenters believed that the sentence was unconstitutionally dispropor-
tionate to the offense.3
Justice Scalia, joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist, found no require-
ment of proportionality within the language or meaning of the Eighth
Amendment. 21 Justice Scalia rejected Harmelin's argument that his
sentence was disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
32
Finding that the three-factor test announced in Solem had been
318. 501 U.S. 957 (1991).
319. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 961 & n.1 (1991). Under the Michigan statute,
the purity of the mixture and whether the person intends to distribute the drug are irrelevant
to the sentencing decision. Id. at 1021-25 (White, J., dissenting).
320. Id at 996-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring with O'Connor and Souter, JJ.); id. at 1012
(White, J., dissenting with Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.).
321. Id. at 957.
322. I& at 996-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring with O'Connor and Steven, jJ.); id at 1012
(White, J., dissenting with Blackmun and Stevens, .J.).
323. Id. at 994 (opinion of Rehnquist, CJ. & Scalia, J.).
324. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1002-04 (Kennedy, O'Connor, & Souter, JJ.,
concurring in part and in the judgment.)
325. Id. at 1021-27 (White, Blackmun, & Stevens, J., dissenting); Id. at 1027-28 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
326. Id. at 974-76.
327. Id. at 74 (finding nothing in the Eighth Amendment that would preclude a
disproportionate punishment, even if appellant could prove that the punishment was
disproportionate).
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rejected in Rumme, Justice Scalia stated that Solem should be over-
ruled. 28
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices
O'Connor and Souter, voted to affirm Harnelin's sentence.
3 29
However, Justice Kennedy concluded that the Court's previous
decisions had recognized only a "narrow" proportionality requirement
in the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause.38 0 According to
Justice Kennedy, the only relevant inquiry under the Solem criteria was
the severity of the sentence relative to the seriousness of the of-
fense. 31 Justice Kennedy emphasized that the Eighth Amendment
"forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to
the crime."33
2
Based on his belief that proportionality review should not be
conducted except in death penalty cases, Justice Scalia provided no
analysis on the merits of Harmelin's claim."33 Between the plurality
opinion by Justice Scalia, and the concurring opinion by Justice
Kennedy, the extent of proportionality analysis in Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence in noncapital sentencing remains unclear. According
to Singletary, "The dissent's view can be best summarized by a
quotation from Justice White: 'While Justice Scalia seeks to deliver a
swift death sentence to [Solem], Justice Kennedy prefers to eviscerate
it, leaving only an empty shell.'"" 4  In refusing to specifically
address the merits of Harmelin's claims, the Court extolled the
principle of federalism in recognizing legislative prerogative to
determine criminal punishments."5 Arguably, however, the Court
328. 1& at 964. Justice Scalia provided an extensive historical analysis of the Eighth
Amendment, concluding that the term "cruel and unusual punishments" was not understood
at the time of the adoption of the Eighth Amendment to include the concept of proportionality.
Id at 975-84. Justice Scalia further reasoned that appellate review of sentencing that includes
a proportionality analysis merely substitutes subjective judicial determinations for the
determinations of legislatures. Id at 986-90.
329. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957,966 (concurring withJustice Scalia in his decision,
but not in his approach to the Eighth Amendment).
330. Id. 996-97 (KennedyJ., concurring in part and in the judgment).
331. Id. at 1004-05 (KennedyJ., concurring).
332. Id. at 1001 (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 288 (1983)). Justice Kennedy did
not find it necessary to conduct an internal and external comparison of Harmelin's sentence
with those in the State of Michigan and in otherjurisdictions. Justice White stated in his dissent
that stare decisis required the application of the three-pronged test in Solem. Id. at 1021. Rather,
Justice Kennedy determined that no punishment of incarceration, even life imprisonment
without parole, would be grossly disproportionate to an offense involving the possession of a
substantial amount of drugs. Id. at 1002-03. According to theJustice, ostensibly non-violent drug
offenses are actually linked to violent crimes, because drug users commit crimes for drug money,
and because the drug business itself leads to violent crime.
333. Singletary, supra note 293, at 1232.
334. Singletary, supra note 293, at 1237 (citing Harmelin at 1018 (WhiteJ, dissenting)).
335. Harmein, 501 U.S. at 986.
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abdicated its responsibility to provide concise judicial review on the
issue of proportionality for dispositive resolution of this matter
throughout the states. s 6
B. Proportionality Analysis by the State of New York
1. Gravity of the Offense
In the state of New York, New. York v. Broadie, 3 7 established the
principles governing Eighth Amendment analysis. In Broadie, the New
York Court of Appeals adopted the principle that a sentence may
constitute cruel and unusual punishment if it is " 'cruelly' excessive,
that is, grossly disproportionate to the crime for which [it is]
exacted." 3  Yet the Broadie court found that sentences imposed by
the drug laws were not so disproportionate as to constitute cruel and
unusual punishment."9 In Broadie, eight defendants convicted of
drug offenses challenged the constitutionality of Rockefeller Drug
Laws classifying their offenses as class A felonies,' and sentencing
provisions imposing a mandatory maximum sentence of life imprison-
ment and minimums from one or six years to eight and one-third
years.
341
As the court summarized in New York v. Thompson,' "in assessing
the proportionality of the mandatory drug sentences, [the Broadie
majority] focused on the following factors: (1) the gravity of the
offense, primarily in terms of the harm it causes society, but also in
comparison with punishments imposed for other crimes in [New
336. Dissenting from a denial of certiorari n Carmona v. Ward, 576 F.2d 405 (2d Cir. 1978),
Justice Marshall stated:
It is axiomatic that this Court should approach Eighth Amendment challenges with
caution, lest it become 'under the aegis of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause,
the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal responsibility ... throughout the
country.' (citation omitted). But neither should the Court abdicate the function
conferred by the Eighth Amendment, to determine whether application of a given
legislative judgment results in punishment grossly out of proportion to specific
offenses. I decline to join the Court in its abdication here.
439 U.S. 1091, 1102 (1979). In Carmona, appellants challenged the constitutionality of their
mandatory indeterminate life sentences for the sale of an individual dose of cocaine and the
possession of one ounce of cocaine. The district court found the sentence unconstitutionally
disproportionate. 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405, 417 (2d Cir.
1978).
337. 332 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y. 1975).
838. New York v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 341 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denie, 423 U.S. 950 (1975)
(appendix) (citation omitted).
339. Id at 346-47.
340. N.Y. PENAL LAW, §§ 220.40, 220.39, 220.18 (McKinney 1991).
341. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 70.00 (2) (a), subd. (3), par. (a), cls. (ii) and (iii); Broadi, 332 N.E.
2d at 341.
342. 633 N.E.2d 1074 (N.Y. 1994).
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York] as well as with punishments for the same or similar crimes in
otherjurisdictions... and (2) 'the character of the offender and the
gravity of the threat he [or she] poses to society.'"'
Considering the "gravity" element of the Broadie cruel and unusual
punishments analysis, the Broadie court found that "[d] rug dealing in
its present epidemic proportions is a grave offense of high rank."",
The Court reasoned that the legislature, in making this assessment,
could properly view criminal narcotics sales as "the crucial link" in the
pernicious cycle of drug abuse,' symptoms of the widespread and
pernicious phenomenon of drug distribution. In measuring the social
harm in drug distribution, the drug seller, at every level of distribu-
tion, is at the root of the pervasive cycle of destructive drug
abuse.34
The New York Court of Appeals reaffirmed these positions in
Thompson:
[T]ime has not eroded this Court's conclusion in Broadie that the
selling of narcotic drugs represents a grave offense of the first
magnitude. Neither has it altered our conclusion on the second
element, that, in comparison to the sanctions for other crimes
under our Penal Law and for the same or similar drug offenses in
other jurisdictions, the mandatory sentences for drug offenses are
'relatively severe, but not irrationally so, given the epidemic
dimensions of the problem."I7
The assessment of the perceived severity of drug offenses warrants
historical analysis and context. According to Lawrence Friedman, in
the nineteenth century, drug laws existed as "scattered" pieces of
legislation.' In general, addiction was not a crime, nor was the
sale or use of narcotics.' However, this situation changed dramati-
cally in the twentieth century when state legislatures enacted the first
initiatives.3 0  For example, in 1905, a New York law declared
cocaine, morphine, and opium to be "poisons," not to be sold at retail
343. New York v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1076 (citing New York v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d
338, 343 (N.Y. 1975)).
344. Thompson, 633 N.E. 2d at 1076 (citing New York v. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338 (N.Y.
1975)). "Although the statutory sentencing scheme at the time equated the punishment level
for drug dealing with that for the most heinous crimes of violence defined in the Penal Law, this
Court [in Broadie ] found such severity not to be unreasonable because 'drug-related crimes may
be much more prevalent, that is, have a higher and rising incidence, than other crimes
comparably punished or equally grave crimes not as severely punished, requiring greater
isolation and deterrence.'" Id. (citing Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at 338).
345. New York v. Broadie, 332 N.E. 2d 338, 344 (N.Y. 1975).
346. Id. at 342 (citations omitted).
347. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1077 (citing Broad/e, 332 N.E.2d at 338).
348. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 355.
349. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 355.
350. FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 355.
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without a warning label.15' However, "the first major landmark of
the drug wars was the [federal] Harrison Narcotic Drug Act [of
1914]. "352 Although ostensibly enacted as a tax statute, its real aim
was to curtail drug traffic." 3 It applied to opium and its derivatives,
and also, very notably, to "coca leaves" and their derivatives. This act
was significant, as it put cocaine in the same pariah class as heroin
and morphine."
From a legal perspective, crime is an act that violates the social
norms, and its prohibition is buttressed by a punishment administered
by the state through a proceeding in its own name. But John Gillin
observed that, viewed from a broader sociological perspective, crime
is "an act that has been shown to be actually harmful to society, or
that is believed to be socially harmful by a group of people that has
the power to enforce its beliefs and that places such act under the
ban of positive penalties." 55 This approach reveals that the defini-
tion of crime is relative, for whether an act is socially harmful
depends on the interpretation of some group-that group, as
criminologistJohn Gillin says, which has sufficient power to make its
beliefs an effective and functioning part of the social order.356
Rudolph Gerber observes that the "federal drug policy, past and
present, has functioned largely as a means to brand marginalized
ethnic groups as deviant."37 The prohibition of certain drugs has
also reflected racial stereotyping. As narcotics laws historian David
Musto states, "[c]ocaine raised the specter of the wild Negro, opium
351. FRIEDiAN, supra note 43, at 355 (citing 35 Stats., Part 1, chap. 100, p.6 14 (Act of Feb.
9, 1909). It was unlawful under this act to import opium or any opium derivative except for
"medicinal purposes." FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 135.
352. FRIEDiAN, supra note 43, at 355 (citing 38 Stats. 785 (Act of Dec. 17, 1914)).
353. FRiE MAN, supra note 43, at 355.
354. FlIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 355.
355. JOHN L. GILlIN, CRIMINOLOGY AND PENOLOGY 9 (3d ed. 1945). As Judge RudolphJ.
Gerber notes, for example:
[IT]he drug war and its disparate impact continues as the last vestige of [the] earlier
ethnic war against those who get their highs without access to the protected, acceptable
drugs of the upper class, such as tobacco and alcohol.... For everyone who dies from
cocaine poisoning, fifteen die from alcohol and sixty from tobacco - related illnesses.
The mortality rate for tobacco users-is estimated-to be more than 100 times greater
than that rate for cocaine users. RudolphJ. Gerber, A System in Collapse: Appearance vs.
Reality in CriminalJusti. 12 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 225, 228-29 (1993).
356. GiLLIN, supra note 355, at 9. See also MARvN E. WOLFGANG, Rae and Cime, in
CHANGING CONCEPTS OF CRIME AND ITS TREATMENT 38 (HUGH J. KLARE ED., 1966) (discussing
symposium for the centenary of the Howard League for Penal Reform). SeesuprapartA-IIIA-D,
this text.
357. GniLN, supra note 335, at 228 (citing RICHARD MILLER, THE CASE FOR LEGALIZING DRUGS
100, 104 (1991)).
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the devious Chinese, morphine the tramps in the slums.""58 On
the longstanding influence of racial stereotyping of African Americans
and cocaine, Musto writes:
The problem of cocaine proceeded from an association with
Negroes in about 1900, when a massive repression and disenfran-
chisement were under way in the South, to a convenient explana-
tion for crime waves. ... In each instance, there were ulterior
motives to magnify the problem of cocaine among Negroes, and it
was to almost no one's personal interest to minimize or portray it
objectively. As a result, by 1910 it was not difficult to get legislation
almost completely prohibiting the drug.359
Thus, the Rockefeller Drug Laws and the federal sentencing
guidelines, which represented the current "get tough" approach for
all levels of drug activity and for all categories of offenders, reflect a
continuing devaluation of those who are most likely to become
ensnared within mandatory sentences. Consequently, as people of
color in the United States continue to experience pervasive discrimi-
nation in all areas of society-employment, housing, and health-they
also are deliberately targeted by the excessive punitiveness of current
legislative penal schemes.
Evidence of the disproportionate penalties associated with offenses
perceived or known to be committed by African Americans can be
seen in the legislative treatment of "crack" versus "powdered" cocaine,
which are pharmacologically identical. While facially such laws do not
appear to be discriminatory, in reality, the overwhelming majority of
those arrested for crack cocaine are black. Thus, blacks convicted
under such laws are virtually certain to receive a greater punishment
for a seemingly facially neutral drug offense than will white offenders.
For example, the Minnesota legislature established penalties for first
time cocaine users to be four years in prison for crack cocaine, and
probation for powdered cocaine.' 6° A higher proportion of black
cocaine traffickers (27% as compared to 4% for whites) were
prosecuted and sentenced for trafficking in crack rather than powder
cocaine.36' Of those convicted of trafficking in crack, 83% were
black. 62 Crack trafficking sentences were, on average, double the
358. DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC CONTROL 255 n.15
(1973) (cited in FRIEDMAN, supra note 43, at 355).
359. MusTo, supra note 358, at 255 n.15.
360. MINN. STAT § 152.021 (Supp. 1995).
361. DouGLAs C. MCDONALD & KENNETH E. CARLSON, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SENTENCING
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS: DOES RACE MATER? THE TRANSITION TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES,
1986-1990, 8-9 (1993).
362. 1& at 106. Seven percent of all crack traffickers were Hispanic, 11% were white. Id.
In contrast, of offenders convicted of trafficking in powered cocaine, 41% were white, 29%
[Vol. 4:1
Fall 1995] CRIME AND SENTENCING
powdered cocaine sentences.363  In Minnesota v. Russel436 Minne-
sota prosecuted five African American men for possession of crack
cocaine. In challenging their convictions, the defendants established
that 97% of those charged with possession of crack cocaine were
black, while nearly 80% of those charged with possession of powder
cocaine were white."t There were substantial differences in penal-
ties. For possession of less than ten grams of powder cocaine, the
penalty was up to five years imprisonment.3  At the trial level,
Judge Pamela Alexander concluded that minorities were sentenced to
much longer periods of incarceration than whites, simply on the basis
of the drug used.367 Applying Minnesota's rational basis test, Judge
Alexander found this disparity to violate the Equal Protection Clause
of Minnesota's Constitutioni. Her findings were upheld on ap-
peal .31 Regrettably, the Minnesota legislature responded to the
Russell decision by increasing the penalties for powder cocaine to
match those for crack cocaine.369
Under current federal statutes, the penalties for crack cocaine are
also more severe than those for powder cocaine.3 0  Every federal
appellate court that has addressed this question has concluded that
racial disparities based on the type of cocaine do not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. 1 Increasingly, however, judges are beginning
to examine the evidence of racial disparity in federal statutes and
guidelines governing the sentencing of crack cocaine. For example,
black, and 30% Hispanic. Id. at 94.
363. Id. at 1.
364. 477 N.W.2d 886 (Minn. 1991).
365. Id. at 887 n.1.
366. MINN. STAT. § 152.023-.025 (Supp. 1993).
367. Russe, 477 N.W.2d at 889-91.
368. Id. at 887.
369. MINN. STAT. § 152.023-.025 (Supp. 1993).
370. 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1) (Supp. 1993).
371. See United States v. Stevens, 19 F.3d 93, 96-97 (2d Cir. 1994) (finding there is a rational
basis for cocaine sentencing guidelines) (citing United States v. Reece, 994 F.2d 277, 278-79
(6th Cir. 1993) (per curiam)); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1213 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding there is a rational basis for more severe penalties for crack); United States v. Frazier,
981 F.2d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1992) (finding there is no evidence that Congress' distinction between
crack and powdered cocaine was motivated by race), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1661 (1993); United
States v. Galloway, 951 F.2d 64, 65-66 (5th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (determining there was no
discriminatory purpose behind the different sentencing guidelines for crack and powdered
cocaine); United States v. King, 972 F.2d 1259, 1260 (11th Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (concluding
there is a rational basis for different penalties for crack and powdered I:ocaine); United States
v. Harding, 971 F.2d 410, 412-14 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding the distinction between crack and
powdered cocaine is rational), cert. deniea 113 S. Ct. 1025 (1993); United States v. Thomas, 900
F.2d 37, 39-40 (4th Cir. 1990) (finding that Congress could rationally have determined that
distribution of crack cocaine merits a harsher sentence than distribution of powdered cocaine);
United States v. Cyrus, 890 F.2d 1245, 1248 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (concluding there are several
factors that provide a rational basis for distinguishing between crack and powdered cocaine).
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Judge Heaney of the Eighth Circuit, has questioned whether the
harsh distinction in sentencing between powder and crack cocaine is
justified. 72 Judge Clyde Cahill, of the federal district court in St.
Louis, concluded that penalizing blacks more seriously for the use of
crack cocaine constituted a direct and frontal assault on black
communities in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.73 In
United States v. Clary, Judge Cahill observed that "[i]nasmuch as crack
and powder cocaine are really the same drug... it appears likely that
race rather than conduct was the determining factor."74 Judge
Cahill also raised concerns regarding prosecutorial discretion.
3 75
After reviewing patterns of prosecution in fifty-seven cases prosecuted
in the Eastern District of Missouri over a three year period, Judge
Cahill stated that, "[w]ithout explanation, the logical inference to be
drawn [from the fact that fifty-five black offenders were prosecuted
but only one white offender was prosecuted] is that the prosecutors
in the federal courts are selectively prosecuting black defendants who
were involved with crack, no matter how trivial the amount, and
ignoring or diverting whites when they do the same thing."
76
In United States v. Wals,377 Judge Louis Oberdorfer of the District
Court for the District of Columbia concluded that mandatory crack
penalties do not violate the Equal Protection Clause, stating that:
372. United States v. Willis, 967 F.2d 1220, 1226 (8th Cir. 1992) (Heaney, J., concurring)
(questioning 100 to 1 ratio used in setting minimum penalties for crack and powdered cocaine.
"Congress had no hard evidence before it to support the contention that crack is 100 times
more potent or dangerous than powder cocaine.").
Judge Bright, who also sits on the Eighth Circuit, has argued that the racial disparities created
by the guidelines were not considered by the Sentencing Commission and can constitute a
mitigating factor whichjustifies the downward departure where not precluded by statute. United
States v. Lattimore, 974 F.2d 971, 977 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright,J., dissenting), cert. denied, 113 S.
Ct. 1819 (1993); United States v. Williams, 982 F.2d 1209, 1214-15 (8th Cir. 1992) (Bright, J.,
concurring).
373. United States v. Clary, 846 F. Supp. 768, 772 (E.D. Mo. 1994) ("The '100 to 1' ratio,
coupled with mandatory minimum sentencing provided by federal statute, has created a situation
that reeks with inhumanity and injustice."), rev'd, 34 F.3d 709 (8th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115
S. Ct. 1172 (1995).
374. Id. at 770.
375. Id. at 787-90.
376. Id. at 790. Similarly, researchers have analyzed the correlation between race and crack
charging practices in Los Angeles. Their findings also support the conclusion that race is a
motivating factor in federal charging decisions. See generally, Preliminary Data on Race and Crack
Charging Practices in Los Angeles, 6 FD. SENT. R. 36 (1993) (analyzing United States v. Jenkins,
Case No. Cr. 91-632-TJH (pending) and suggesting that the racial distribution for crack offenses
is widely different from the racial distribution for arrests). The data surveyed in the Los Angeles
study reveal that not a single Anglo was charged at the federal level over a four-year period from
1988 to 1992. SeeJoseph E. Finley, Discrimination in Crack Charging in Los Angeles: Do Statistics Tell
the Whole Truth About "Selective Prosecution?', 6 FED. SENT. R. 113 (1993) (discussing the
implications of selective prosecution claims based on the Equal Protection Clause).
377. 841 F. Supp. 24 (D.D.C. 1994).
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[a]lthough the disparity between the crack and powder penalties
and the heavy impact of that disparity on black defendants is
manifestly unfair, the record ... does not provide a preponderance
of evidence that the disparate impact can be traced to a discrimina-
tory purpose.... Moreover, our Court of Appeals has established
... that the reasons that the government has given for the greater
penalties for crack as opposed to powder cocaine offenses satisfy
rational basis review, despite the apparent similarity between the
two forms of the drug and the extreme concentration of crack
convictions among the black population. 7
8
Significantly, however, Judge Oberdorfer held that statutory
mandatory minimum sentences for crack cocaine constituted cruel
and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment as
applied to two of four defendants in that case.179  Judge Ober-
dorfer's ruling was the first federal decision to find the harsher
statutory penalty for crack cocaine, as compared to that for powder
cocaine, unconstitutional." ° Judge Oberdorfer found that mandato-
ry sentences made only "marginal contributions to any discernable
social or public purposes""1 when applied to defendants whose
conduct was in part driven by their underlying addiction to crack and
who were only "bit players" in the conspiracy.s 2
The view that the differential punishments between "crack" and
"powder" cocaine in cases like Russell Claty and Walls constitute
disparate and disproportionately harsh sentences is not shared by all
scholars addressing this issue.sa" Notably, Professor Randall Kenne-
dy has written that "Russell was wrongly decided. . .. [A]s a
constitutional matter, the state [of Minnesota] was justified in
penalizing possession of crack cocaine more harshly than possession
of powdered cocaine notwithstanding the racial demographics that
378. 1& at 31.
379. Id. at 31-32.
380. L at 31-32. Judge Oberdorfer found the punishment cruel and unusual only as applied
to two particular defendants. He stated, "[w]hether the same ... conclusion, will be
appropriate to some of the many defendants who face these penalties remains for the courts
that sentence them to determine." ML at 32.
381. 1& at 33 (quoting Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 312 (1972)).
382. United States v. Walls, 841 F. Supp. 24, 33 (D.D.C. 1994)
383. See e.g., Regina Austin, "The Black Community," Its Lawbreakers, and a Politics of
Identification, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1769, 1770-71 & nn.3-7 (1992) (stating
Nothing illustrates the multiple threats to the ideal of "the black community" better
than black criminal behavior and the debates it engenders. There is no shortage of
controversy about the causes, consequences, and cures of black criminality. To the
extent there is consensus, black appraisals of questionable behavior are often in accord
with those prevailing in the dominant society, but sometimes they are not. In any
event, there is typically no unanimity within "the community" on these issues.).
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emerged from the operation of this sentencing scheme.""s  Profes-
sor Kennedy argues that well-meaning scholars who seek to "champi-
on the interests of African Americans... retard the efforts to control
criminality"' by leveling "overblown and counterproductive""8 6
allegations against states as evidence of invidious racial discrimina-
tion.' While Professor Kennedy's primary point that crime dispro-
portionately affects members of communities of color as victims is
accurate and worthy of sustained attention, it is preposterous to
presume that members of directly affected communities advocate
greater punishments for offenders who are persons of color than for
white offenders.' Clearly, state and federal governments have
failed communities of color in both respects by simultaneously
underprotecting law-abiding citizens and overpunishing their
members who commit criminal offenses.
In the omnibus Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act
of 1994, Congress directed the United States Sentencing Commission
to examine the differential federal sentencing policy relating to the
possession and distribution of powder cocaine and crack cocaine." 9
Under the current federal sentencing guideline scheme, the penalties
for first-offense cocaine trafficking provide for a five-year mandatory
minimum penalty for 5 grams or more of crack cocaine or 500 grams
or more of powder cocaine; a ten-year mandatory minimum penalty
384. Kennedy, supra note 259, at 1256.
385. Kennedy, supra note 259, at 1255.
386. Kennedy, supra note 259, at 1256.
387. Kennedy, supra note 259, at 1258 (citing Dorothy Roberts, Crime, Race, and Reproduction,
67 TUL. L. REv. 1945 (1993) (arguing that states regard control of reproduction as a means of
addressing crime);John A. Powell & Eileen B. Hershenov, Hostage to the Drug War: The National
Purse, the Constitution and the Black Community, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 557 (1991) (maintaining
that the drug war victimizes minorities and that, instead of imposing criminal sanctions, the
government should pursue a policy of treatment, education and rehabilitation); Gary Peller,
Criminal Law, Race, and the Ideology of Bias: Transcending the Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TiUL. L.
REv. 2231 (1993) (suggesting that a black nationalist approach to criminal law would reject the
"views of the mid to late nineteenth century white elites" embodied in substantive criminal law).
388. Indeed, as Professor Regina Austin posits:
Degenerates, drug addicts, ex-cons, and criminals are not always "the community's"
"others." Differences that exist between black lawbreakers and the rest of us are
sometimes ignored and even denied in the name of racial justice. "The black
community" acknowledges the deviants' membership, links their behavior to "the
community's" political agenda, and equates it with race resistance. "The community"
chooses to identify itself with its lawbreakers and does so as an act of defiance. Such
an approach might be termed the "politics of identification."
Austin, supra note 383, at 1774.
389. U.S. Sentencing Commission, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY (1995) at I. See also Cocaine: Crack and Powde, WASH. POST, Mar. 10, 1995,
atA20 (concurring with the U.S. Sentencing Commission's preliminary report as to the currently
unjust sentencing guidelines that disproportionately distinguish between crack cocaine and
powdered cocaine).
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for 50 grams or more of crack cocaine or 5,000 grams or more of
powder cocaine.390 This sentencing differential is commonly de-
scribed as the "100-to-1 quantity ratio."9 l
In what U.S. Sentencing Commission member Wayne A. Budd
described as a "defining moment" in the responsibilities of public
service, members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission recommended
an end to the sentencing disparity between powder cocaine and crack
cocaine.3 2 Referring to the Sentencing Commission's extensive 250-
page report, Commissioner Budd testified before the SenateJudiciary
Committee that, "[W]e looked hard for ajustification for the 100-to-1
quantity ratio, and found, unanimously that there was no empirical or
policy justification for it." 3
It should be noted that the Commission's recommendation does
not disavow a belief in the greater danger of crack versus powdered
cocaine usage or enterprise. Rather, it concluded that a dispropor-
tionate penalty ratio of 100-to-1 could not bejustified. The Commis-
sion therefore recommended that while base sentences for crack and
powder cocaine should be equalized, final sentences should be raised
by new enhancements for all forms of cocaine use.394 Whereas the
prevalence of such enhancements may be greater in crack cocaine
involvement, e.g., violence, drive-by shootings, sale to juveniles or to
pregnant women, sale in protected areas, significant prior criminal
records, and other factors, arguably the same enhancements could
render the base penalty more severe for powder cocaine involvement
as well. Thus, the final sentences would be more reflective of the
seriousness of the actual offense and the individual offender.
Nevertheless, an end to the disparity is not in sight. On September
7, 1995, a House Judiciary subcommittee voted to reject the Commis-
sion's recommendations for sentencing parity. As voiced by House
Judiciary Committee member RepresentativeJohn Conyers, the House
390. U.S. Sentencing Commission, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY (1995) at iii. Emphasis added.
391. Id. at iii.
392. Testimony of Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Before the Committee on
the Judiciary of the United States Senate, Aug. 10, 1995, 1995 FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING-
HOUSE, at 4.
393. Testimony of Wayne A. Budd, U.S. Sentencing Commission, Before the Committee on
the Judiciary of the United States Senate, Aug. 10, 1995, 1995 FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING-
HOUSE, at 4. See generally U.S. Sentencing Commission, SPECIAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS:
COCAINE AND FEDERAL SENTENCING POLICY (1995).
394. U.S. Sentencing Commission, SPECIAL REPORTTO THE CONGRESS: COCAINE AND FEDERAL
SENTENCING POLICY XW, 198-200 (1995). See also Testimony of Richard P. Conaboy, Chairman,
U.S. Sentencing Commission, Before the Committee on the Judiciary of the United States
Senate, Aug. 10, 1995, at 1-3.
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subcommittee's rejection "absolutely ensures the continuation of
manifestly unjust sentences." 9
2. Character of the Offender
Addressing the proportionality issues related to the extent of Angela
Thompson's individual culpability and the threat she poses to society,
the New York Court of Appeals followed similar findings made
regarding the defendants whose sentences were reviewed in Broadie,
in which the Court determined that
although not all of the defendants were "hardened" criminals, each
was convicted of at least 'street' sales or possession of large amounts
of narcotics and none was what might be described as merely an
'accidental' offender; therefore ... each could reasonably be
considered a serious threat to society meriting severe punish-
ment. 96
Accordingly, in Broadie and in Thompson, the sentences were not
deemed to be grossly disproportionate to the crime committed.
Writing for the majority in Broadie, ChiefJudge Breitel deferred to the
Legislature's judgment stating,
[t]hus, to achieve the deterrence, so far seemingly elusive, the
would-be drug trafficker had to be put on notice that, should he be
caught, his fate was sealed regardless of his position in the
hierarchy of distribution and regardless of the quantity of drugs in
which he dealt 3 97
Subsequently, in New York v. Jones,3 the New York Court of
Appeals determined whether the imposition of the mandatory
maximum sentence of life imprisonment for a drug-related offense
violated the constitutional prohibitions against cruel and unusual
punishments. The defendant, a millhand in a large-scale heroin
packaging and distribution operation, was arrested in aJanuary 1970
raid and charged with joint possession (along with fourteen others)
of over four pounds of heroin. The prosecution offered the
defendant and the other millhands the opportunity to plead guilty to
a lesser offense with a one-to-three-year sentence but the defendant
chose to go to trial. She was found guilty. Jones appealed on the
grounds that the mandatory sentence she received was cruel and
unusual punishment, but a majority of the Court of Appeals dis-
395. Lori Nitschke, Law/Judidaty: Panel Rejects Plan for Sentene, CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY
WEEKLY REPORT, Sept. 11, 1995, at 1-2.
396. NewYorkv. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074,1076 (N.Y. 1994) (citing NewYorkv. Broadie,
332 N.E.2d 338, 343 (N.Y. 1975), cert. denA 423 U.S. 950 (1975)).
397. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at 344.
398. 350 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. 1976).
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agreed."s The majority's holding contrasts sharply with the dis-
sent's conclusion that the inconsistency between the sentences given
to the defendant and to the other millhands, who had accepted the
prosecution's offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense, was cruel and
unusual punishment because it presented such a gross violation of the
principle of equality of treatment for equally blameworthy offenders
and because it essentially punished the defendant for exercising her
right to a trial.4°°
Again, in New York v. Donovan, mandatory sentences for drug selling
and possession were measured against the constitutional proscriptions
of cruel and unusual punishments.1 In Donovan, the defendant's
boyfriend was a drug dealer who sold close to four ounces of cocaine
to an undercover officer. The defendant's role in the drug sale
involved procuring the cocaine. For her participation in the scheme,
she was convicted of first degree criminal sale and first degree
criminal possession of a controlled substance. Donovan herself made
no profit from the sale, and the pre-sentence report described her
involvement as "out of character" for her."°2 The prosecution
offered her the option of pleading guilty to a lesser offense and
receiving a one to three year sentence.4°3 Donovan rejected this
offer, was convicted at trial and received the minimum mandatory
sentence of fifteen years to life imprisonment. In contrast, Donovan's
boyfriend cooperated with the authorities and, in return, received a
sentence of lifetime probation, despite the fact that he was the
principal actor in the drug sale.' ° On appeal, the Court of Appeals
found the defendant's sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. 5
Norman Little, who was Angela Thompson's uncle and codefendant
at trial, ran a major drug-selling operation in Harlem. He was the
focus of a police investigation and prosecution in which the police
made four separate undercover drug purchases as part of an attempt
to arrest Little and shut down his drug operation. °
At some point, Little began using Thompson as part of his drug
operation .407  Thompson was charged with an A-I felony for her
399. Id, at 915.
400. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1076-77 (discussingJnes, 350 N.E.2d 913).
401. 451 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1983), af/'g 454 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983).
402. Donovan, 454 N.Y.S.2d at 119-22 (MollenJ., dissenting).
403. I,
404. I
405. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1077 (citing Donovan, 451 N.E.2d 492 (N.Y. 1983)).
406. i& at 1081.
407. Id
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participation." The prosecution offered her a deal in which she
would plead guilty to a lesser offense and receive a sentence of three
years to life and, just before trial, another deal in which she would
receive four years to life, but Thompson refused both offers. 09 The
State subsequently argued: "[f~rom the start, the People knew that
Thompson had committed a class A-I felony meriting a sentence of
fifteen years to life; their plea offer was an act of grace, extended in an effort
to mitigate the undeniable anguish caused by cases like this. [H]aving
rejected the offer, Thompson cannot reasonably complain that she is
now exposed to a sentence of fifteen years to life. She should be
resentenced to that term.""0 The State's rather glib reasoning
illustrates Professor (and former federal district court judge) Albert
Alschuler's observation that "[t]he sentencing reform movement has
not restricted sentencing discretion so much as it has transferred
discretion from judges to prosecutors."4 Moreover, it must be
contrasted with the treatment of the cases against co-defendant
Norman Little. He was indicted, inter alia, for five criminal sales of a
controlled substance in the first degree, including four separate sales
on different dates. In a deal with the State, he pleaded guilty to only
one count, under which he was sentenced to fifteen years to life
imprisonment.412 In other words, despite three prior felony and
seven prior misdemeanor convictions, he received the same sentence
for an offense at least five times the magnitude of wrongfulness for
which Angela Thompson was convicted and sentenced.413
408. Id. at 1081-82 (BellacosaJ., dissenting).
409. Id. at 1082 (Bellacosa,J., dissenting).
410. BriefforRespondent-Cross-Appellant (DistrictAttomey), at44, NewYorkv. Thompson,
596 N.Y.S.2d 421 (1993) (emphasis added).
411. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 926. See also Albert W. Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
Prosecsutoial Power. A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and -Presumptive" Sentencing, 126 U. PA.
L. REV. 550,566-68 (1978) (arguing that plea bargaining in a system offixed sentences combines
the worst features of charge bargaining and sentence bargaining, where "[u]nder a fixed-
sentencing regime, bargaining about the charge would be bargaining about the sentence.").
In addition, it is misleading to regard the minimum of the indeterminate sentence as the
constitutional benchmark for Eighth Amendment purposes. More than the harsh mandatory
minimum, it is the maximum term of an indeterminate sentence that is the pertinent standard
for Eighth Amendment purposes. In the NewYork drug law scheme, the variation between the
mandatory minimum sentences for A-I, A-II, and A-III offenses is vitiated because each class A
offender is subject to a maximum term of life imprisonment. Thus, the "total failure to tailor
the maximum indeterminate sentence in any meaningful way to the culpability of the offender,
the gravity of the offense, and the peculiar circumstances of each case... renders the life
sentences imposed .. .constitutionally suspect." Carmona v. Ward, 436 F. Supp. 1153, 1169-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1977), rev'd, 576 F.2d 405, 413 n.13 (2d Cir. 1978) (finding revisions in class A
offenses, with the possibility of lifetime parole no longer presents possibility of a "life sentence"),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979).
412. Thompson, 633 N.E. 2d at 1083 (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
413. In addition, defense counsel argued, without contradiction, another aspect of dis-
proportionality at the sentencing of Angela Thompson:
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Ruling that the punishment her uncle received did not establish the
gross disproportionality of Thompson's sentence, the court explained:
While undoubtedly his far greater culpability merited substantially
more punishment than defendant received, the comparative
leniency in treatment of defendant's uncle is significantly less than
that objected to in New York v. Jones... and New York v. Donovan.
... And, even in those cases, the disparity in punishment was not
sufficient to establish gross disproportionality.414
Thus, as inJones and Donovan, where the defendants rejected similar
plea offers of three years to life, the court of appeals held that a
disparity of this type does not amount to cruel and unusual punish-
ment.4 15  Significantly, however, former Chief Judge Breitel, who
authored the seminal Broadie decision, ardently dissented against the
very kind of disproportionate sentencing in New York v. Jones, under
near-identical circumstances to Thompson.41 s
The New York Court of Appeals's decision in Thompson was the
first decision concerning disproportionate sentencing since New York
v. Broadie, in which that court overruled a lower court's imposition of
a sentence more lenient than the legislatively mandated minimum
sentence as a means of achieving a constitutional sentence.1 7
There was also, during this arrest, the arrest of a third female, who could have been
charged with an A-I felony, a young lady, I believe similar in age to the defendant. She
had made or assisted in the sale, A-I weight, to Officer Dante Grey. And during the
hearings it came out, I believe, her nickname was Shorty. But, my memory could be
wrong, that the District Attorney's Office decided not to prosecute her because they
were afraid at that time that if they had arrested her, Mr. Little would know who the
undercover officer was at that time, and this was early on in the proceedings. ... But
it shows how another young individual,just like Miss Thompson, doing the exact same
act, because of discretionary decisions by the District Attorney's Office, is not standing
here today, before the Court, facing these consequences. That she's not being
sentenced, she hasn't even been charged. It's alleged she did the same thing that Miss
Thompson did on one occasion. The undercover testified, I believe, truthfully at trial.
He never saw Angela Thompson on any other date during this investigation, before
arrests were made, other than that one date that the sale was made. This was over a
six week period of time, he's back and forth to that location. It shows the type of
involvement Miss Thompson had.... That type of disparity where individuals are not
prosecuted for legitimate reasons, and because of the fear it might have that they
might give information to someone else who has been arrested, and the type of
disparity where Mr. Little receives the same sentence that this defendant faces today,
although he chose to plead guilty and she chose to go to trial, maintaining her
innocence, shows why this particular case is not a case where 15 to life should be given
to the defendant.
Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1083 (Bellacosa,J., dissenting) (citing NewYork v. Thompson, Sup. Ct.,
NY County, Dec. 11, 1989, Bing-Newton, J., indictment No. 03994-89, Sentencing Minutes).
414. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1078.
415. 1& at 1078-79.
416. Id at 1083, (Bellacosa, J., dissenting) (citing New York v. Jones, 350 N.E.2d 913, 915
(N.Y. 1976), (Breitel, CJ., dissenting)).
417. Id. at 1085 (BellacosaJ., dissenting), (citing New York v. McCleese, 522 N.E.2d 1055
(N.Y. 1988) (affirming a Supreme Court decision that found a minimum mandatory sentence
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Thompson, therefore, demonstrates the problems caused when judicial
discretion is eliminated from sentencing. Defendants who have
challenged the limitation or removal of trial court discretion in
sentencing, however, have not been successful. Although some
defendants have maintained that individualized sentencing is a liberty
interest protected by due process, courts have not accepted these
arguments.18 In other cases, defendants have argued that depriving
trial judges of sentencing is a violation of the principle of separation
of powers.419  Courts have not accepted this argument either,
however, because the legislative, judicial and executive branches of
government have historically shared sentencing responsibilities.42
Thus, it is the Eighth Amendment's proscription against cruel and
unusual punishment which most strongly supports the principle for
individualized sentencing." This support is especially apparent in
death penalty litigation. In such cases, the sentencing judge must
"not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect
of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less
than death." 2 Justices Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, underscored
the principle in the Woodson v. North Carolina plurality decision:
[W]e believe that in capital cases the fundamental respect for
humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the
circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally
was not cruel and unusual punishment)); New York v. Ortiz, 478 N.E.2d 187 (N.Y. 1985)
(holding mandatory sentences were unconstitutional); New York v. Donovan, 451 N.E.2d 492,
aftg 454 N.Y.S.2d 118 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982); New York v. Jones, 350 N.E.2d 913 (N.Y. 1976).
Compare, NewYorkv. Martinez, 595 N.Y.S.2d 39 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (reducing sentence of four
and a half to nine years for criminal sale of a controlled substance in the third degree reduced
to two to four years because sentencing statute was unconstitutionally applied), appeal denied,
619 N.E.2d 674 (N.Y. 1993); with NewYork v. Skeffery, 591 N.Y.S.2d 1012 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992)
(affirming reduction of mandatory sentence of fifteen years to life for criminal possession of a
controlled substance in the first degree reduced to five years to life); and New York v. Andrews,
574 N.Y.S.2d 719 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (reducing mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years
to life for A-I drug felony to five years to life to avoid being "cruel and unusual"), appeal denied,
590 N.E.2d 1206 (N.Y. 1992); New York v. Ramirez, 210 N.Y.LJ. 22 (1993) (giving 17 year-old
defendant a sentence of probation following a conviction of criminal sale of a controlled
substance in the second degree). But cf., New York v. Royster, 457 N.Y.S.2d 726 (Rockland
County Ct. 1982) (sentencing defendant who pleaded guilty to one count of criminal sale of a
controlled substance in the third degree to five years probation), vacated, 464 N.Y.S.2d 560 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1983).
418. Lowenthal, supra note 237, at 118.
419. Lowenthal, supra note 237, at 118-19.
420. Lowenthal, supra note 237, at 119.
421. Lowenthal, supra note 237, at 119.
422. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 587 (1978).
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indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death.43
Furthermore, as Professor Alschuler has stated, "[d]esert and
proportionality have as much to do with human beings and their
circumstances as they have to do with harm."4 24 Accordingly, the
focus should be on the offender rather than on the offense.4
Treating cases involving the same offense alike without regard for the
circumstances of the offender is inconsistent with the ideal of
equality.4
26
When courts have tried to make exceptions to the U.S. Sentencing
Commission's guidelines in order to take into consideration a
defendant's background, the commission has reacted by changing its
rules to eliminate courts' ability to deviate from the guidelines.2 7
The victims of such rule changes have generally been offenders who
have overcome bleak life prospects. For example, when the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a sentence reduction for a Native
American defendant who overcame childhood hardship to achieve a
commendable work record,42 the commission decided to forbid
reductions for "employment-related contributions and similar prior
good works."1 9  Similarly, after the Ninth Circuit affirmed a sen-
tence reduction due to a defendant's lack of guidance as a youth,
410
the commission changed its policy so that reductions for "lack of
guidance as a youth and similar circumstances indicating a disadvan-
taged upbringing," would not be allowed. 1 This effort by the
commission to eliminate any regard of offenders' background has
primarily affected disadvantaged offenders. Kate Stith and Steve Yoh,
in a 1993 article on the federal sentencing guidelines, concluded that
"denying judges the opportunity to mitigate sentences on the basis of
social disadvantage has worked against poor and minority defen-
dants." 2
423. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976), quoted in Lowenthal, supra note
237, at 123.
424. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 909.
425. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 910.
426. Alschuler, supra note 236, at 916.
427. TONRY, supra note 25, at 169.
428. United States v. Big Crow, 898 F.2d 1326 (8th Cir. 1990).
429. TONRY, supra note 25, at 169-70.
430. United States v. Lopez, 945 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1991), amended by 956 F.2d 203 (9th Cir.
1992).
431. TONRY, supra note 25, at 170.
432. Kate Stith and Steve Yoh, The Politics of Sentencing Reform: The Legislative History of the
FederalSentencing Guidelines, 28 WAKE FORESr L. REV. 223,287 (1993) quoted inTONRY, supranote
25, at 170 (emphasis added).
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3. Rara Avis: The "Rare Case" Exception
Significantly, the analysis of the lower and appellate courts in
Thompson, and the majority and dissenting opinions at each level,
centered on the so-called "rare case" exception enunciated in New
York v. Broadie.433 In dicta at the end of the opinion, Chief Judge
Breitel pronounced in Broadi. "[t]his is not to say that in some rare
case on its particular facts it may not be found that the statutes have
been unconstitutionally applied."4"
Although the courts were not provided guidance in identifying the
"rare case," the exception has been interpreted to "apply to defen-
dants whose involvement in the offense is only accidental or who only
technically fit the statutory definition of the offender class."435
Underlying such a standard, then, would seem to be an acknowledge-
ment of the varying levels of culpability and personal circumstances
between drug operation masterminds and their minions. The
exception, however, has been rendered meaningless for two primary
reasons.
First, the lack of genuine guidance has left courts unable or
unwilling to find the exception in cases where it might apply. Chief
Justice Breitel himself vigorously dissented to the Court of Appeal's
refusal to apply the exception in New York v. Jones, wherein he found
"[tlhe mandatory sentence of life imprisonment.., unconscionable
and barbaric because of the gross inequality of treatment of like
persons involved in the identical crime."4"6 Similarly in the New
433. 332 N.E.2d 338, 347 (N.Y. 1975). In Thompson, the trial court applied this "rare case"
exception in holding that a fifteen-year minimum would be unconstitutional in this case. She
sentenced Angela Thompson to eight years to life. See New York v. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d
421, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (Asch, J., with Carro and Rosenberger, U.) (affirming the
judgment of the Supreme Court, NewYork County). But see id. at 425 (Wallach,J., with Sullivan,
J.P., dissenting) (arguing that Angela Thompson's crime "was no mere technical or accidental
violation of the narcotics laws"), rev'd 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (1994) (Levine,J., with Kaye, CJ.,
Simons, and Smith, _U.) ("[T]he foregoing factors militate against finding that [Thompson] is
the rare case we envisaged in Broadide). But see id at 1081 (Bellacosa, J., with Ciparick, J.,
dissenting) ("This case falls within Broadie's "rare case" exception, examined, understood and
applied in the brighter light of contemporary standards, based on twenty years of experience
and empirical data").
434. NewYorkv. Broadie, 332 N.E.2d 338, 347 (N.Y. 1975) (Breitel, CJ.) (citation omitted),
cert. denied 423 U.S. 950 (1975)). See also Thompson, 633 N.E.2d at 1076 (finding that "street"
sales of narcotics warranted severe punishment on public policy grounds, even if the defendants
were not hardened criminals). This type of sentencing was not unconstitutionally applied
according to the court.
435. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 425 (Wallace, J., dissenting) (citing Broadie, 332 N.E.2d at
343).
436. New York v. Jones, 350 N.E.2d 913, 915 (N.Y. 1976) (Breitel, CJ., dissenting). The
defendant was a 37 year-old woman with no prior convictions. She and 14 others were involved
with a heroin processing operation were prosecuted for acting in concert to possess over four
pounds of heroin. Twelve of the codefendants pleaded guilty to lesser offenses. Of these
[Vol. 4:1
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York Supreme Court's Thompson opinion, the justices supporting the
reduced sentence also noted that it was the Defendant's first
conviction.4 7
In addition, however, the justices asserted Angela Thompson's
youth was one of the central bases for the unconstitutionality of the
mandatory sentence in this case.4' While this factor was clearly
compelling in light of the harsh nature of the sentence, there was no
indication that youth, per se, was envisaged as a rare circumstance to
be considered by the courts. Indeed, indications suggest the contrary.
Apparently, the New York Legislature consciously decided to include
youths of Thompson's age within the ambit of the A-I drug felony
mandatory minimums. 39 Nevertheless, on comparable facts, the
appellate courts have upheld downward departures from mandatory
sentences on the bases of age (youth), role and degree of participa-
tion, and differential sentences of co-defendants. ° Thus, affirming
the "rare case" exception appears to be less a matter of principled
consistency than caprice.
Second, those cases that conceivably merit "rare case" consideration
are not rare at all. Indeed, the cases are far too typical, involving
many defendants of color, especially disproportionate numbers of
African American and Latina women. Thus, despite the repeated
focus on Thompson's youth, remarkably, there was scant mention of
her race, gender, parental or economic status.4 1 Judge Bellacosa's
dissent was the first to explicitly suggest that the combination of these
characteristics might be relevant within the comprehensive consider-
ation of sentencing factors.' Judge Bellacosa stated that "[e]mpir-
ical data and analysis may even be developed or discovered from
codefendants, the principal got a sentence of 8 1/3 to 25 years, 3 "lieutenants" received
indeterminate sentences of 5 years, and 8 millhands, who had committed the same crimes as
Jones, received indeterminate sentences of 3 years.
Jones did not accept the offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense. Instead, she exercised her
right to trial and was convicted by ajury. Jones was subsequently sentenced to the mandatory
term of 15 years to life. Id at 916 (Breitel, CJ., dissenting) (citing N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 70.00(2) (a)-(3) (a)).
437. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 422.
438. I& at 424.
439. New York v. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1078 (N.Y. 1994) (Levine, J.) (citing N.Y.
CmIM. PRO. LAW § 720.10(2) (a), N.Y. CRaI. PRO. LAW § § 220.10(5)) (discussing the prevalence
of adolescents marketing illegal drugs and the likelihood that the Legislature rationally
determined that teenage drug dealers pose a serious threat to society).
440. See supra note 411, and accompanying text (discussingjudicial discretion in sentencing).
441. Thompson, 633 N.E.2d 1074, 1079 (N.Y. 1994) (holding that because someone was a
youth did notjustify vacating a life sentence for cocaine dealing on grounds that the sentence
vas cruel and unusual punishment).
442. i& at 1087 (BellacosaJ., dissenting) (citing MACDONALD AND CARLSON, supra note 361,
at 10-14 (noting wide sentencing disparities based on race in the crack cocaine offense
category)).
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official correctional records and reports to show that these kinds of
mandatory sentences fall disproportionately and exploitatively on
young minority recruits including, as in this case, an African American
teenage woman."'
In this regard, available data reveals the "rare case" exception to be
an ineffective safeguard against what is manifestly a problem of
systemic, not isolated, dimensions. The impact of the New York State
drug laws was predictable, and their inequities by now are quite
apparent. As Judge Levine acknowledged:
[T]he harsh mandatory treatment of drug offenders embodied in
the 1973 legislation has failed to deter drug trafficking or control
the epidemic of drug abuse in society, and has resulted in the
incarceration of many offenders whose crimes arose out of their
own addiction and for whom the cost of imprisonment would have
been better spent on treatment and rehabilitation. The experience
of the last two decades has clearly vindicated the doubts Chief
Judge Breitel expressed in New York v. Broadie on the wisdom of the
draconian drug sentencing laws. 4
However, rather than address the institutional deprivations that
define the communities most likely to find drug possession or
distribution a tenable life option, the New York legislature and
judiciary, as well as otherjurisdictions embracing the current "severity
revolution,"' have perpetuated the historical devaluation and
excessive criminalization of the members of these communities.
In affirming the trial judges' sentence in Thompson, Supreme Court
Justice Asch noted that "[t] he genius of our constitutional system is
that it is not static, but rather, yields to the lessons and requirements
of changing times."' This statement is particularly true of the
evolving nature of Eighth Amendment analysis. The Rockefeller Drug
Laws enacted twenty years ago have proven counterproductive in
quelling the drug problem and have resulted in harsh, disproportion-
ate mandatory sentences.447
The mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years with the
prospect of incarceration for life represents one of the most severe
penalties prescribed under New York State law.'3 It expresses
society's and the Legislature's highest level of condemnation for the
443. Id- at 1087.
444. i& at 1080.
445. Aishuler, supra note 236, at 903. This is Professor Alschuler's terminology for the
current emphasis on retributive ideals in United States sentencing policies.
446. New York v. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993).
447. TONY, supra note 25, at 175.
448. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 60.10, 7.05.
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most serious offenders who commit the most reprehensible crimes
such as, murder in the first and second degrees," 9 kidnapping in
the first degree, 0 and arson in the first degree. 45 1 Furthermore,
such harsh penalties and ostensibly color-blind sentencing guide-
lines452 fail to recognize that poverty, educational deprivation and
family instability fall disproportionately on women of color, thus,
perpetuating their subordinate position in society. Moreover, cultural
images of African American women based on stereotypes are at the
very foundation of the problem of African American women's limited
access to societal resources and institutions. Thus, treating such
circumstances as mitigating factors would tend to diminish disparities
in sentencing.
While courts must accord appropriate deference to the legislature
regarding its presumptively constitutional sentencing schemes, the
imposition of prison terms so disproportionate in length, in compari-
son to the gravity of the offense and the dangerousness of the
offender, should be deemed cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution.
PART D: CONCLUSION
Although the foregoing discussion has centered on the impact of
sentencing reform in the State of New York, clearly the dynamics it
addresses have far-ranging significance. With over one million people
in custody, 3 the United States incarcerates a higher proportion of
its people than any other country in the world,' 4 and women are
the fastest growing population in custody. 5  New York leads the
nation with a five-fold increase over the past decade in the number of
women behind bars.5 6 But these numbers do not reflect a parallel
rise in crime. While the United States' overall incarceration rate
sharply increased in the past decade, the crime rate has significantly
449. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 125.27, 125.25.
450. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.25.
451. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 150.20.
452. Congress instructed the U.S. Sentencing Commission to "assure that the guidelines and
policy statements are entirely neutral as to the race, sex, national origin, creed, and
socioeconomic status of offenders." 28 U.S.C. § 994(d) (1988). See generally Breyer, supra note
249.
453. TRAcy L. SNELL, U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, CORRECrIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE U.S., 1992
iii (1995).
454. See Mara Maver, Amedcans Behind Bars: The International Use of Incarceration 1992-1993
(The Sentencing Project, Washington, D.C.) Sept. 1994, at 3 (Table 1) & 4 (Figure 1)
(comparing the rates of incarceration for selective nations).
455. SNELL, supra note 453, at v.
456. Susan Brenna, Mother and Child Reunion, NMVSDAY, Aug. 25, 1994, at B4.
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decreased.' 57 Today, African American women are arrested and
imprisoned in greater numbers because of changes in legislative
responses to the "war on drugs," law enforcement practices, and
judicial decision-making, rather than changes in the underlying
circumstances in their lives.
The unwritten subtext of contemporary sentencing reform
enactments perpetuates the historical perception of African American
women as unworthy and unredeemable, thereby legitimating their
harsh treatment under such laws. As the first part of this Article
illustrates, throughout their experience in the United States, African
Americans have been arrested, convicted and incarcerated grossly out
of proportion to their numbers in the population. Continuing
disparities exist between African Americans and whites in virtually
every measurable category. And, as we have seen, the status of being
an African American woman still carries a vulnerability to being both
labeled and severely punished as a criminal. This vulnerability does
not apply to white women. The methods by which African American
women's rights escape legal protection continue to occur in subtler
institutionalized forms. The result is justice that is nearly as cruel
today as it was during colonial and antebellum periods.
Throughout American history, the subordination of blacks was
supported by a series of stereotypes and beliefs that rationalized the
imposition of adverse conditions upon their lives." Prior to the
civil rights reforms, blacks were formally subordinated by the state.
Today, overt forms of discrimination have been reduced; however,
African Americans continue to experience being the "other" in
symbolice 9 and material terms."
457. TONRY, supra note 25, at 166 (demonstrating the increased harshness of sentencing in
the United States). Professor Tonry states:
Since the 1970s, sentencing in the United States has become progressively harsher
between 1980 and 1994, while crime rates were either falling (according to the
National Crime Victimization Survey based on its interviews of victims) or the number
of inmates in American prisons and jails triples.
Id.
458. See generally, DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION,
1770-1823 (1975) (analyzing the origins and implications of slavery in western culture);JORDAN,
supra note 47 (examining attitudes of whites towards negroes during European and African
settlement of what became the United States); JOEL WILLIAMSON, THE CRUCIBLE OF RACE:
BLACK-WHITE RELATIONS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH SINCE EMANCIPATION (1984) (addressing the
nature of relations between blacks and whites in the American south); C. VANN WOODWARD,
THE STRANGE CAREER OFJIM CROW (1955) (describing the history of racial segregation and 'Jim
Crow" laws).
459. Rimberle Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation in
Antidiscrinination Law, 10 HAR. L. REV. 1331, 1337 (1988) (defining "symbolic subordination"
as "the formal denial of social and political equality to all Blacks, regardless of their accom-
plishments. Segregation and other forms of social exclusion-separate restrooms, drinking
fountains, entrances, parks, cemeteries, and dining facilities-reinforced a racist ideology that
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Noting not only the injustice, but also the counterproductive aspect
of mandatory drug laws, in affirming the trial court's sentencing
decision at the Supreme Court level in Thompson, Justice Asch wrote
for the majority:
A system ofjustice which mandates a fifteen year prison sentence,
as a minimum, on a seventeen year old girl, who was not cared for
by parents and under the domination of her uncle, who was the
prime mover in the sale of narcotics, also mandates a lifetime of
crime and imposes on the community, upon her release, a woman
who may be incapable of anything but criminal activity. If we do
not attempt to rehabilitate such young people, we condemn
ourselves as well.4'
The New York City Bar Association and the Drug Abuse Council
studied the Rockefeller Drug Laws from 1973 to 1976, when the new
laws were in full force.46 2  Its 1977 report concluded that the
Rockefeller Drug Laws did not achieve their objectives. 4' Further-
more, the Committee concluded: "[drug use] is incontrovertibly
deeply rooted in broader social maladies. Narcotics use in particular
is intimately associated with, and a part of, a wider complex of
problems that includes family break-up, unemployment, poor income
and education, feeble institutional structures, and loss of hope." "
Now, more than two decades later, it is clear that New York State and
the Nation would be better served by offering women options, such
as alternatives to incarceration, community corrections and/or
Blacks were simply inferior to whites and were therefore not included in the vision of America
as a community of equals.").
460. According to Professor Crenshaw, "material subordination, on the other hand, refers
to the ways that discrimination and exclusion economically subordinated Blacks to whites and
subordinated the life chances of Blacks to those of whites on almost every level. This
subordination occurs when Blacks are paid less for the same work, when segregation limits access
to decent housing, and where poverty, anxiety, poor health care, and crime create a life
expectancy for Blacks that is five to six years shorter than for whites." Id. at 1377 (citing BUREAU
OF CENSUS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICALABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 69-71 (107th
ed. 1987)).
As Professor Crenshaw recognizes, "[tihese two manifestations of racial subordination are not
mutually exclusive. In fact, it only makes sense to separate various aspects of racial oppression
in this post-civil rights era in order to understand how the movement changed some social
norns and reinforced others. Most Blacks probably did not experience or perceive their
oppression as reflecting two separate structures." Id. at 1377 n.177.
461. New York v. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d 421, 424 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993). See also Michael
Z. Letwin, Report from the Front Line: The Bennett Plan, Street-Level Drug Enforcement in New York City
and the Legalization Debate, 18 HOFSTA L. REV. 795, 821-22 (1990) (arguing that "[c]rim-
inalization also makes it harder than it already is for felons to find legitimate work, thereby
increasing the likelihood of a new arrest/and or parole or probation violation, and further
incarceration.").
462. JOINT COM~ifrEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 7.
463. JOINT COMMIrfEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 7.
464. JOINT COMMITTEE ON NEW YORK DRUG LAW EVALUATION, supra note 243, at 7.
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treatment." For many women, incarceration becomes the last stop
in a long series of circumstances that has prevented them from
participating in their families and contributing in their communities.
Social structures and systems of domination must be recognized for
their own roles in maintaining African American women and their
communities in a position of marginality. As stated by Michael Tonry:
The willingness of the drug war's planners to sacrifice young black
Americans cannot be justified. Crime and drug abuse do dis-
proportionately affect disadvantaged minority communities.
Amelioration of their effects should be a paramount policy priority.
... What was clear both then and now is that a program built
around education, drug abuse treatment, and social programs
designed to address the structural social and economic conditions
that lead to crime and drug abuse would have much less destructive
impact on disadvantaged young blacks than would a program whose
primary tactics were the arrest, prosecution, and lengthy incarcera-
tion of street-level sellers who are disproportionately black and
Hispanic.'
"Mandatory minimum sentences have been widely condemned.
The Judicial Conference of the United States, the twelve Circuit
Courts of Appeals or their Judicial Councils, the American Bar
Association, the Federal Courts Study Committee, and other groups
have called for their repeal."467 In 1993, Judge Jack Weinstein,
SeniorJudge of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New
York, decided to stop handling drug cases. He did so, he said,
because:
I need a rest from the oppressive sense of futility that these drug
cases leave.... I have taken my name out of the wheel for drug
cases.. .. This resolution leaves me uncomfortable since it shifts
465. In a survey of 48 states, the District of Columbia, Guam and Puerto Rico, the National
Association of State Alcohol and Drug Abuse Directors found that 1,838,833 people sought
treatment for substance addiction at publicly funded treatment centers during fiscal year 1989
and that 462,906 of them were women. WILLAM BUTrYNSKI ET AL, STATE REsoURCEs AND
SERVICES RELATED TO ALCOHOL AND OTHER DRUG ABUSE PROBLEMS 21, 25, 33 (1990).
Constance Weisner, of the University of California at Berkeley, stated in a presentation before
the National Institute on Drug Abuse "that in an undisclosed U.S. county, '26% of drug users
in jail have had a drug treatment episode in the last year' prior to incarceration, while 'in the
drug treatment sample, 78% have had ajail episode in the last year.' What these and other data
indicate, Weisner said, is that drug users 'get to jail before they get to treatment.'" Id. at 9-10.
James Collins, of Research Triangle Institute, added the observation that "[drug] offenders
generally do as well as others in treatment." Id. See also Research Measuring Current Need for Drug
Abuse Treatment Should be Conducted -NDA Meetings, 37 THE BLUE SHEET, Aug. 10, 1994, at 10-11.
466. TONRY, supra note 25, at 123.
467. David C. Leven, Curing America's Addiction to Prisons, 20 FORDHAi URn. LJ. 641, 655
(1993) (citing LYNN S. BRANHAM, THE USE OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED STATES: A LOOK
AT THE PRESENT AND THE FUTURE 22 (Apr. 1992)). Mr. Leven is a member of the Criminal
Justice Section of the ABA.
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the "dirty work" to otherjudges. At the moment, however, I simply
cannot sentence another impoverished person whose destruction
has no discernible effect on the drug trade. ... I am just a tired
old judge who has temporarily filled his quota of remorseless-
ness.
46
The proportionality principle is significant to retributivist notions
of fairness in criminal sentencing. For utilitarians, punishment is an
inherent evil which should be used as sparingly as possible so
proportionality is not a primary concern. As postulated by eminent
utilitarian theoristJeremy Bentham, punishment "ought only to be
admitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil."469
For retributivists, such as Kant, however, the proportionality rationale
is more central to a just punishment scheme. To date, however, the
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit and the New York Court of
Appeals have declined to set aside a term of incarceration because of
its excessive length, even though the principle of proportionality has
been accepted.4 70 If the Eighth Amendment is to have any mean-
ing, all drug offenders simply cannot be deemed to deserve punish-
ments as harsh as those of murderers or other violent offenders.
Therefore, in view of courts' unyielding deference to legislative
prerogative, state and national legislatures must act to reverse these
draconian measures. As a nation, the debate on the response to
crime must include the courage and insight of Justice Juanita Bing-
Newton, the trial judge, who saw her future and her fate linked to
Angela Thompson:
This case is bringing me to tears literally. In the three years I've
sat on the Bench, I've never been reduced to tears. I do so because
I look at the defendant, that I know a Judge is not supposed to; I
put myself in the feet of Angela Thompson and I can remember
being an 18 year old girl. . . and it's very difficult for me to wipe
out all that in my life, and then sentencing her to 15 years to life
without wiping out the possibility of Angela Thompson....
I conclude that the defendant, to be sentenced to 15 years to life,
would be getting an unconstitutional sentence. And I will not
sentence her to 15 years to life. I make this and I want the record
468. Jack B. Weinstein, Perspective: No More Drug Cases, 209 N.Y. L.J. 2 (1993).
469. JERMY BMNMiA, THE WORKS OFJEREMY BENTHAM (John Bowring, ed.) (1843), quoted
in TONRY, supra note 25, at 152.
470. Downey v. Ferin 518 F.2d 1288 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 423
U.S. 993 (1975) (striking down a sentence for a term of years solely because of its length). This
is the only circuit court to do so. In Downey, the defendant received a sentence of 30 to 60 years
imprisonment for his first offense of possession and sale of a small amount of marijuana. In
today's atmosphere, it is likely that Downey would be overruled by Harmelin.
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to be clear.... I make this determination not on a discretionary
basis, but in applying the Broadie standard to this case.
71
The importance of such empathy cannot be overstated. In what
Professor Samuel Pillsbury has called "the empathy obligation," part
of evaluating the offender's offense requires an effort by the decision-
maker to empathize with the offender, that is, care for the good in his
or her character.47 Many African American women in United
States society and its penal institutions are locked in a spiral of
physical, emotional and economic distress. Despite years of resistance
and struggles to survive, adverse systemic conditions lock many of
them into a vicious cycle of poverty, substance abuse, criminal
behavior, incarceration and compromised health.
A more effective approach to criminal sentencing would balance
society's concern for safety with the constitutional mandate for
proportionate punishment. For African American women, a
comprehensive approach to sentencing would require that their
humanity and potential be recognized by a society that has seldom
valued them for such. Recognition of this sort, through properly
conceived penal sanctions and sentencing determinations which
properly balance objective and subjective factors, would begin to end
the cycle of despair, criminality, disparate treatment, and excessive
punishment that pervades many African American women's lives.
471. New York v. Thompson, 596 N.Y.S.2d at 422-23.
472. Samuel H. Pillsbury, Emotional Justice: Moralizing the Passions of Criminal Punishment, 74
CORNELL L. REV. 655, 693 (1989). Defining the "empathy obligation," Professor Pillsbury states
that:
Empathy values and seeks to find the good in the offender's character. Thus the
sentencer should be informed of the obligation to care about the offender as a morally
worthy creature and should be given the opportunity to hear about [her] good deeds,
[her] capacity for and desire to do good.
Id. at 694 (footnote omitted).
Under this construction, "while empathy does not preclude a judgment of culpability,"
importantly, the decisionmaker who feels empathy for the offender will "care about potential
limitations on culpability." Id. So defined, such empathy comports with the constitutional
demands of proportionality review.
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